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 This research examined the effect of the Aerospace Expeditionary Force 
deployment process, comprised of individual anxiety, group unity, and work-group 
characteristics, on team cohesion, deployment commitment, and team effectiveness.  The 
sample obtained included 643 airmen who had deployed within a 12-month period or 
who were scheduled to deploy within the next 3-month period.  The methods of analysis 
of variance and multiple regression were used to evaluate the six research objectives and 
nine hypotheses. 
 Results indicate that the Aerospace Expeditionary Force deployment process has 
indeed positively affected team cohesion and perceived team effectiveness.  These results 
were found to be positive regardless of whether individuals deployed as teams from the 
same base or as individuals from separate bases.  These findings indicate that it may be 
satisfactory to deploy individuals by themselves, but that commanders should take all 
measures necessary to avoid doing so as the deployment commitment and perceived team 
effectiveness relationship is positively affected by individuals deploying as a team and 




AEROSPACE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IMPLEMENTATION AND THE EFFECT 
ON TEAM COHESION 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the background and motivation for this research and 
provides the objectives of the study.  Additionally, the chapter briefly describes the 
research approach, discusses the scope and limitations that may be encountered during 
the duration of the research, and concludes with a brief overview of the thesis. 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
Since 1989, the number of personnel deployed by the United States Air Force has 
steadily risen every year through 2000 (Aerospace Expeditionary Force, 2000).  To 
compound this increased Operations Tempo (OPSTEMPO), the number of active duty 
Air Force personnel has steadily declined during the same time period.  These two issues, 
coupled with the use of an archaic deployment personnel management tool called 
PALACE TENURE, first implemented in the mid-1980s, created a need to increase team 
integrity during deployments to capitalize on the synergistic effects of teams (Holpp, 
1999).  To meet this need, the Air Force needed to revamp how it would accomplish all 
assigned stateside taskings and mission requirements, in addition to continuing to 
maintain our United States overseas presence.  These concerns drove the Air Force to 
reevaluate how to deploy individuals in a more efficient manner.  The Air Force, within 
the context of its expeditionary background, reacted to the problems of increased 
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OPSTEMPO and decreased personnel strength by using the Expeditionary Aerospace 
Force (EAF) as a strategy to mitigate these concerns and strains (Obruba, 2001). 
The EAF concept is how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains 
itself by creating a mindset and cultural state that embraces the unique characteristics of 
aerospace power – range, speed, flexibility, precision – to meet the national security 
challenges of the 21st Century (AFI 10-400, 1999).  The EAF is best described as the Air 
Force’s plan to continue to meet dynamic requirements.  An Aerospace Expeditionary 
Force (AEF) is an organizational structure composed of force packages of capabilities 
providing warfighting commanders with rapid and responsive aerospace power (AFDD 2, 
2000).  The AEF is best described as how the Air Force will actually implement the EAF 
concept.  The AEF employment was accomplished by reorganizing the majority of the 
Air Force’s Total Force into ten lead wings, five mobility lead wings, and two on-call 
aerospace expeditionary wings.  This reorganization provides a composite of capabilities 
from which force packages are developed and tailored to meet mission requirements (AFI 
10-400, 1999). 
The EAF construct is primarily designed around two primary tenets: to provide 
trained and ready aerospace forces for national defense and to meet national 
commitments through a structured approach which enhances Total Force readiness and 
sustainment (AFI 10-400, 1999).  Ancillary benefits of EAF implementation include 
increased predictability for deploying troops, swift and lethal global response, and 
increased team integrity by deploying as many people as possible from the same base 
through the AEF team deployment structure (AFDD 2, 2000). 
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The AEF was first initiated in the United States Air Force on 1 October 1999.  
This AEF team deployment structure was implemented to ensure Area of Responsibility 
(AOR) missions were successfully accomplished by scheduling permanently assigned 
lead AEF wings and bases.  Despite successes in these areas, the shift toward 
expeditionary operations presents numerous challenges, particularly in combat support 
(Gallway, 1999). 
One challenge is the concern regarding the use of personnel from different 
locations to deploy together and how that influences team integrity, one of the ancillary 
benefits of the EAF construct.  The intent is to form an Aerospace Expeditionary Wing 
(AEW) from units of a single Air Force base (AFDD 2, 2000).  However, feedback from 
Wing and AOR commanders, in the form of After Action Reports (AARs) and Joint 
Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) reports, appears to indicate that the current 
system for fulfilling AEF obligations may not be promoting the AEF goal of team 
integrity.  Currently AEF obligations are filled with ad hoc teams of individuals that have 
been brought together from an array of installations, major commands, and backgrounds, 
similar to the antiquated PALACE TENURE process.  PALACE TENURE sourcing 
standards impaired team integrity by deploying individuals from many different bases to 
the same deployed location.  Consequently, these individuals were unfamiliar with one 
another and resulted in inadequate deployed team cohesion.  Colonel Walter Burns states 
in a U.S. Department of Air Force report (Agency Group 09, 2001): 
Before, you would have seven or eight different bases providing one or 
two or three people to go over to do the work in a particular shop.  The 
team developed after they got off the plane and reported for duty.  




By deploying from geographically separated bases, individuals were not afforded 
the opportunity to train together in an effort to become familiar with each other.  This 
pre-deployment training and familiarity is valuable for several reasons.  This type of 
familiarization allows individuals to share ideas and experiences, build group identity, 
understand the dynamics of interpersonal relationships, and get to know their own 
strengths and weaknesses and those of their co-workers (Noe et al., 1997).  In the end, we 
hope that pre-deployment familiarization eases individual anxiety as the deployment 
nears and begins.  Based on the AARs and the JULLS, deployed AOR commanders feel 
that maintaining team integrity is critical to AEF group and team cohesiveness, which 
enhances mission success.  Additionally, this AEF teaming concept also means most 
expeditionary combat support troops travel with the aircrews and maintainers from their 
wings (Agency Group 09, 2001). 
The importance of teams and teamwork cannot be understated in a military 
environment.  Numerous studies indicate that team cohesion has synergistic effects on 
military operations and is critical to military success.  For instance, Sterling (1982) 
concluded that efforts should be made to maintain unit integrity across as many (Army) 
activities as possible.  Yukl (1998) states that team and group cohesiveness could lead to 
higher mutual cooperation and individual identification with the team.  Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the ability for deploying AEF teams to train together 
prior to deployments would lead to increased team cohesion.  Intuitively, one would 
expect increased team cohesion to positively affect team effectiveness.  Indeed, research 
suggests teams that are effective in training develop procedures to identify and resolve 
errors, coordinate information gathering, and reinforce each other (Oser et al., 1989). 
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Additionally, these findings imply that team cohesion can be built from these 
attributes.  It is this body of research that serves as the impetus for this study to determine 
if the Air Force’s EAF concept of operations is succeeding in creating deployed team 
cohesion and team effectiveness.  Additionally, this research is done to provide a more 
complete picture of the EAF construct to senior managers and decision makers. 
 
Initial AEF Team Cohesion Model Creation 
To further understand the focus of this research, a theoretical model was 
constructed.  The model is based on the constructs of the current AEF Air Force team 
deployment process, team cohesion and team effectiveness.  As shown in Figure 1.1, one 
underlying premise of the AEF team deployment concept is that it increases team 
cohesion.  This is based on the notion that if individuals deploy from the same base, they 
are familiar with each other’s skills, abilities, strengths, and weaknesses.  Hypothetically, 
this increase in team cohesion appears to consequently increase team effectiveness.  A 
cohesive team, with a variety of members whose skills and experiences differ and 
complement each other, can take on a wider range of tasks (Campion et al., 1995). 
 
     
     
               












Expanding Team Cohesion in the Initial Model 
Measuring the effect of the AEF team deployment concept is difficult and beyond 
the scope of this study.  Additionally, measuring true deployed team effectiveness 
requires metrics that are beyond the scope of this study.  However, the concept of team 
cohesion within the model is one that can be measured.  Widmeyer et al. (1985) 
determined there are two key distinctions to be made when defining team cohesiveness.  
The first distinction evaluates differences between the individual and the group.  The 
individual aspect of cohesion is encapsulated in the notion of individual attraction to the 
group; that is, the extent to which the individual wants to be accepted by group members 
and remains in the group (Carless, 2000).  The group aspect explores individual 
perceptions of closeness, similarity, and unity within the group.  The second distinction 
evaluates the difference between task and social cohesiveness.  Task cohesiveness is the 
extent of “motivation towards achieving the organization’s goals and objectives” 
(Carless, 2000).  Social cohesiveness deals with the motivation of an individual to 
develop and nurture social relationships in a group (Carless, 2000). 
 
1.2  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES/HYPOTHESES 
This research will attempt to increase our knowledge and understanding of how 
the AEF team deployment structure may affect deployed team cohesion and ultimately 
team effectiveness.  It is hypothesized that increased team integrity, resulting from the 
new EAF manpower sourcing standards, will lead to increased team cohesion, which 
subsequently causes an increase in perceived team effectiveness.  Specifically, this 
research has the following objectives. 
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(1) Determine if individuals are deploying predominantly with teams from the 
same lead wings or as individuals from different wings within the deployment 
rotation. 
 
(2) Determine if personnel understand how the AEF deployment structure works. 
 
(3) Determine if implementation of the AEF team deployment concept has 
resulted in increased deployed team cohesion.  Specifically, this research will 
attempt to evaluate how the input factor of individual anxiety affects the team 
cohesion factor. 
 
(4) Determine if individuals deploying from different bases (i.e., deploying by 
themselves and joining another group) perceive deployed team cohesion 
differently than individuals who deploy as a team (i.e., deploying as a group 
from one base). 
 
(5) Determine how long it typically takes individuals to adjust to, and feel like a 
member of, a cohesive team. 
 
(6) Determine if team cohesion may affect perceived team effectiveness. 
 
 
1.3  METHODOLOGY 
This research will consist of a single cross-sectional, web-based survey designed to 
measure the various constructs comprising the proposed hypothetical model.  The 
research project will measure the perceptions of individual airmen who deployed within 
the January 2001 to February 2002 time period.  This will be accomplished to understand 
the perceptions of individuals who have deployed under the AEF deployment process 
within the last 12 months.  Additionally, the survey will be sent to individuals who are 
about to deploy, or are scheduled to deploy, within the March 2002 to May 2002 time 
period.  This will be accomplished to categorize the pre-deployment perceptions of 
individuals scheduled to deploy within a three-month period.  The data will then be 
evaluated using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 10.1, which is 
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ideal for analyzing descriptive statistics and inter-item reliabilities of the proposed 
constructs. 
 
1.4  IMPLICATIONS 
To date, little research exists within the Air Force on EAF team deployments, 
especially in the team cohesion and perceived team effectiveness arena.  Further research 
is required to better understand and describe the existing EAF team deployment sourcing 
system and the impact on team cohesion and team effectiveness.  If anxiety is found to 
moderate the deployed team cohesion and perceived team effectiveness relationship, the 
results could lead to changes in the AEF team deployment process.  Additionally, it is 
anticipated that this research will provide a baseline for Air Force strategists to compare 
against in future studies involving other AEF cycles and team rotations.  The results of 
the study might even be extrapolated to potentially explain similar teaming behaviors in 
future AEF rotations.  Finally, it is anticipated that senior EAF managers and decision 
makers could use the model as a benchmarking tool to ensure team integrity is 
maintained during future AEF deployments. 
 
1.5  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This study is not designed to measure the AEF team deployment process by itself.  
For purposes of this research, the AEF team deployment process is comprised of the 
policies and regulations in-place that guide the deployment of individuals to fulfill 
manpower requirements.  Instead, it will attempt to determine how the AEF team 
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deployment process influences team cohesion and perceived team effectiveness.  This is 
done in an effort to provide a more complete picture of the EAF construct to senior 
managers and decision makers. 
Within every study, there is both a defined scope and imposed parameters to set 
specific boundaries on the research.  This study is defined by the following scope. 
(1) The research will focus on Air Force active duty personnel involved in the 
second and third cycles of the AEF construct.  Only AEF rotations 5/6, 7/8,  
and 9/10 will be evaluated within the second AEF cycle.  Additionally, AEF  
rotation 1/2 will be evaluated within the third cycle.  Other AEF cycles and  
rotations will not be evaluated. 
 
(2) The study will be based on a review of existing AEF literature, AEF survey  
       results, and statistical analysis for validity of the proposed model using  
       SPSS 10.1. 
 
(3) The model will only consider how current sourcing procedures support the         
AEF goal of maintaining team integrity. 
 
1.6  PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 will provide a historical perspective on the EAF deployment concept 
and will review relevant EAF, AEF, team, and team cohesion literature based on the 
proposed constructs.  Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology used to gather and assess 
the data collected.  Chapter 4 will analyze and display the data results.  Finally, Chapter 5 
will explore the implications of the data by relating the results back to the posed 




II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly describes the United States Air Force’s PALACE TENURE 
program to provide manpower for deployed missions.  It then explains the Expeditionary 
Aerospace Force (EAF) and how the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) provides the 
foundation for the EAF deployment concept.  With this foundation established, team 
concepts are explored to include team dynamics, team integrity, team cohesion, and team 
effectiveness.  Finally, the research model and construct theories will be explored and 
explained. 
 
2.2  PALACE TENURE 
From its inception in September of 1947 to the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 
August of 1989, the Air Force has focused on a Cold War mentality of containment.  
During this time, the primary enemy the United States prepared for was posed by the 
Communist threat, which made it easy to justify and focus resources in specific areas 
around the globe in an effort to contain the threat.  The Air Force’s strategy to meet this 
threat was to rely on robust basing in the Continental United States (CONUS) and at 
overseas locations where it operated from bases with large infrastructures.  This was 
possible because the Air Force had a large manpower pool of approximately 700,000 




To meet personnel requirements for worldwide deployment operations in specific 
areas of responsibilities (AORs), the Air Force used a personnel management program 
called PALACE TENURE.  An AOR is a specific geographic area set up for the purpose 
of assigning responsibilities to selected installations for receiving and distributing 
requirements and related services (AFLMA, 2000).  There were two prime objectives of 
the PALACE TENURE program.  The first was to facilitate increased notification time to 
deploying personnel.  From a PALACE TENURE perspective, timely notification was 
defined as a minimum of 45 days advance notice prior to the deployment date (DPWRM, 
1995).  The main purpose of the notification requirement was to provide the deploying 
member enough time to adequately prepare for the forthcoming deployment, presumably 
alleviating individual stress and anxiety.  The second prime objective, to a lesser extent, 
was to optimize the use of the readiness system that supports rotational requirements 
(DPWRM, 1995).  Neither objective focused on deploying personnel as a team.  
PALACE TENURE was designed and implemented to assign temporary duty (TDY) 
support for long-term contingency operations by rotating personnel from various bases 
throughout the Air Force to deployed locations.  The system filled the required positions 
on an individual basis (Haug, 2000). 
A key shortfall under PALACE TENURE was that deployed commanders did not 
have visibility of incoming deploying forces, which made long-term planning and 
resource forecasting nearly impossible (Haug, 2000).  This occurred because personnel 
requirements were piecemealed from multiple bases throughout the deployment 
timeframe.  That is, individuals were assigned to deployments individually from multiple 
bases and commands.  For example, deployed AOR teams could consist of eight 
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individuals from eight different bases (Mottley, 2001).  This piecemeal assignment 
method caused additional stress to Air Force members because it did not provide stability 
and predictability in terms of who would deploy, when they would deploy, and how they 
would deploy (Haug, 2000).  Additionally, these piecemeal assignment methods lead to 
personnel receiving much less time than the required minimum of 45 days notification 
(Bennett, 1998). 
These sourcing concerns were compounded by the fact that each Major Command 
(MAJCOM) deployment manager used their own methods of assigning individuals to fill 
deployment positions.  While each manager tried to be as fair as possible, concern with 
manning levels at individual bases and in specific Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) 
caused some individuals to deploy more often than others (Obruba, 2001).  Additionally, 
base manning documents were often not up-to-date and resulted in erroneous 
identification of some individuals. 
The PALACE TENURE sourcing method was not designed to maintain base-
level team integrity in the AOR.  Nowhere in the sourcing process was there any 
consideration for deploying teams from a single base.  Consequently, these individuals 
were not afforded the opportunity to learn individual traits, characteristics, strengths, and 
weaknesses of their team members until they arrived in the AOR.  Also, individuals were 
not afforded the opportunity to plan for their projected deployments due to the short pre-
deployment notification times.  Intuitively, this process could lead to poor initial unit 
cohesion due to lack of group unity and increased individual anxiety.  Additionally, it is 
easy to see how the process could lead to frustration among deploying individuals.  These 
concerns helped propel the deployment restructuring and the transition to the EAF. 
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2.3  EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE FORCE (EAF) 
An EAF Historical Perspective 
 
As the excerpt below indicates, the concept of the United States aerospace forces 
being expeditionary is nothing new. 
 
The Air Force has always been “expeditionary” in the sense that it 
has historically taken the fight to the enemy, whether Pancho Villa 
in Mexico; the Germans in World War I Europe; the Japanese in 
Burma, the Philippines, and the Pacific; or the Nazis and Italian 
fascists in North Africa and Europe (Dowdy, 2000). 
 
 
Dowdy (2000) goes on to state that the Korean War was the Air Force’s first attempt at 
designing a “rapid response force.”  Composite Air Strike Forces (CASFs), activated on 8 
July 1955, were designed, developed, and implemented with the goal of “rapid 
deployment of decisive airpower anywhere in the world” (Dowdy, 2000).  Although 
CASFs were considered a huge success, they were deactivated in 1973 for economical 
reasons.  In its 18-year history, CASFs responded to many foreign contingencies such as 
the Lebanon Crisis, the Taiwan Straits Crisis, and multiple Vietnam insurgencies.  
Interestingly, these CASF packages deployed largely as teams. 
In 1980, the Carter Administration recognized the need to rapidly deploy military 
teams to deter non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in the Persian 
Gulf.  In response to this need, the military developed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task 
Force (RDJTF).  The RDJTF provided rapid deployment capabilities and support to deter 
any Persian Gulf NATO threat.  The Air Force’s contributions to the RDJTF were B-52H 
bomber squadrons and several tactical air wings (Dowdy, 2000).  The RDJTF was 
assigned to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) on 1 January 1983. 
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Incorporating the strengths of the RDJTF, the Air Force moved to the “composite 
wing” concept in 1990.  The purpose of this concept was to strategically consolidate and 
realign Air Force resources.  An ancillary benefit of moving to the composite wing 
concept was that it set the foundation for the EAF construct by forcing Air Force wings to 
prepare as integrated teams, with integrated weapon systems, from the same bases. 
However, before a complete transition to the EAF construct could be made, the 
downfall of the Soviet Union occurred in 1989 and there was a perceived feeling of calm 
in the world.  Consequently, the United States Congress ordered military reductions for 
both personnel and equipment resources.  These reductions, based on the fact that the 
Cold War threat no longer existed, failed to recognize that the frequency of Military 
Operations Other than War (MOOTWs) requiring United States involvement would 
increase.  Examples of MOOTWs include international aid efforts, humanitarian 
missions, and disaster relief support.  In fact, since the Cold War ended, the Air Force has 
deployed at a rate nearly four times higher than prior to the demise of the Cold War 
(Dowdy, 2000).  This is reflected in Figure 2.1, which shows the number of personnel 
deployed in the Air Force has steadily risen from about 4,500 in 1988 to almost 20,000 in 
1999.  The large spike of deployed personnel in 1990 indicates Persian Gulf War 
operations, specifically Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield.  Figure 2.1 also 
shows the number of active duty Air Force personnel has dropped by approximately 45 
percent during the same time period, from almost 600,000 in 1988 to just over 350,000 in 






Source:  Aerospace Expeditionary Force, 2000 
Figure 2.1.  Air Force Strength vs. Deployments, 1988-1999 
 
The message is clear; as the number of international missions and requirements 
were increasing, the Air Force’s manpower pool was dramatically being reduced.  The 
strain on the Air Force in the early 1990s served as a catalyst to accelerate 
implementation of the EAF.  In 1998, Acting Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters 
prepared the Air Force for a full transition from PALACE TENURE to complete EAF 
implementation when he said: 
During the Cold War, the Air Force was a garrison force focused on 
containment and operating as wings primarily out of fixed bases in the 
United States, Europe, and the Pacific.  Over the last decade, we have 
closed many of those fixed bases, and our operations have been 
increasingly focused on contingency operations in which selected 
squadrons deploy from these locations to forward bare bases for the 
duration of the mission.  EAF organizationally links forces in 
geographically separated units into standing air expeditionary forces.  
These forces would deploy from Air Force installations and be ready 













































EAF Concept and Objectives 
 
The EAF concept is a vision of how the Air Force will organize, equip, and train 
forces to create a mindset and cultural state that embraces the unique characteristics of 
aerospace power in the 21st Century (AEF Intro Brief, 2001).  The EAF concept is 
focused on global engagement while operating within a reduced force structure from 
fewer forward operating locations.  EAF forces were designed to deploy to any airfield 
around the world capable of handling both operational and airlift aircraft, regardless of 
whether the airfield was a fully equipped military base or a bare base with minimal 
facilities (Gallway, 1999).  The goal was to replace the forward presence of airpower 
with a force that, in response to a crisis, can deploy quickly from the continental U.S. 
(CONUS), commence operations immediately on arrival, and sustain those operations as 
needed (Tripp, 2000).  The light, lean, and lethal force was developed as a flexible option 
for either large-scale crisis or small-scale contingencies (Lee, 1999); major regional 
conflicts will require the implementation of theater war plans. 
The EAF concept provides the capability of identifying and deploying 
comprehensive teams and avoiding the piecemeal sourcing methodology represented by 
PALACE TENURE.  By identifying requirements and teams well ahead of time, the 
supported Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) can build their steady-state rotation and 
strategic airlift schedules well in advance (Robertson, 2000).  This early identification 
process provides greater predictability and creates team integrity by allowing tasked 
wings to begin training and working together.  To implement the EAF concept, the Air 




2.4  AEROSPACE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (AEF) 
It has been argued that October 1994 represents the birth of the AEF force 
deployment strategy.  By that time, the Persian Gulf War force redeployment was nearly 
complete and minimal manpower and equipment resources existed in the AOR.  In the 
wake of the coalition force drawdown, Iraqi forces threatened Kuwait again and the Air 
Force was able to rapidly rush manpower and equipment resources back in theater to 
deter the Iraqi forces.  Lieutenant General John P. Jumper, 9th Air Force and Central 
Command (CENTCOM) commander at the time and now the Air Force Chief of Staff, 
recognized the responsiveness of the effort and immediately became a strong advocate of 
the AEF’s feasibility.  General Jumper lobbied for and led many test deployments in the 
CENTCOM AOR.  Because of his efforts, General Jumper has been credited with being 
the “father of the AEF” (Dowdy, 2000). 
The AEF represents the Air Force’s organizational strategy to adjust to the 
ambiguous post-Cold War environment, a declining defense budget, and a reduced 
forward presence (Nowak, 1999).  General Jumper considers the AEF to be an integral 
part of the service’s ability to successfully carry out mission requirements.  In an excerpt 
from an interview published in Air Force Magazine (October 2001), General Jumper 
stated: 
 
We have already drawn down our overseas basing to critical 
levels….Our forces are capable of traveling thousands of miles to 
conduct precision strikes.  However, to conduct an effective air 
campaign, …you must have persistent airpower and the capability to 
perform time-critical strikes, which dictate that either permanent or 
temporary forward basing will continue to be a requirement for 




General Jumper’s statement reinforces the need for the Air Force to continue its 
transition to a fully functioning expeditionary aerospace force.  To guide this transition, 
five key principles were identified: capability, predictability and stability, mobility 
efficiency, force management, and integration.  These principles are shown in Table 2.1 
along with their respective benefits. 
 
 
Table 2.1.  Key AEF Principles 
AEF PRINCIPLE EXPLANATION 
Provides a platform of capability - CINCs know force capabilities for  
   their specific AORs 
Provides predictability and stability - Troops can better plan their personal  
   schedules by knowing when their 
   specific AEF is vulnerable to deploy 
More efficient use of mobility assets - Decreasing funding levels force better  
   utilization of resources 
Force management tool - Personnel and Logistical planners can  
   better schedule resources to meet  
   CINC requirements 
Better integration of “Total Force” - All Air Force personnel assigned to  
   mobility UTC authorizations 
 
Source:  Aerospace Expeditionary Force, 2000 
 
As the transition developed, ten lead combat AEF wings, five lead mobility AEF 
wings, and two Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs) were created as shown in Table 
2.2.  The combat AEFs support missions and objectives of the forward operating 
locations within each respective AOR.  The mobility AEFs provide airlift support for 
equipment and troops to the respective AORs.  The AEWs are on standby to provide 
additional support in case a crisis occurs outside the scope of the AEF’s responsibilities.  
Developed in this manner, the AEFs and AEWs deploy as units and thus maintain the 
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EAF objective of enhanced team integrity.  Other bases within the Air Force provide 
forces to augment manpower and equipment requirements when needed.  All efforts are 
made to deploy at least five individuals from these bases to maintain team integrity 
(Mottley, 2001). 
 
Table 2.2.  AEF/AEW Breakdown 
Lead AEF Wings (10) AEF 1 - 388th FW (Hill AFB) 
AEF 2 - 7th BW (Dyess AFB) 
AEF 3 - 3rd WG (Elmendorf AFB) 
AEF 4 - 48th FW (Lakenheath AB) 
AEF 5 - 355th WG (Davis-Monthan AFB) 
AEF 6 - 20th FW (Shaw AFB) 
AEF 7 - 27th FW (Cannon AFB) 
AEF 8 - 28th BW (Ellsworth AFB) 
AEF 9 - 2nd BW (Barksdale AFB) 
AEF 10 - 1st FW (Langley AFB) 
Lead Mobility AEF Wings (5) AEF 1/2 - 43rd AW (Pope AFB) 
AEF 3/4 - 60th AMW (Travis AFB) 
AEF 5/6 - 22nd ARW (McConnell AFB) 
AEF 7/8 - 319th ARW (Grand Forks AFB)
AEF 9/10 - 92nd ARW (Fairchild AFB) 
Lead AEWs (2) - 366th WG (Mountain Home AFB) 
- 4th FW (Seymour-Johnson AFB) 
 
Source:  Airman Magazine, January 2001 
 
To meet the EAFs total force objectives, the AEFs and AEWs are comprised of 
active duty, reserve, and Air National Guard resources (personnel and equipment).  To 
meet the AOR theater requirements, each AEF/AEW is designed to organize capabilities 
in a manner that provides tailored forces, with each organization designed to have about 
the same relative force capability.  It is important to understand these diverse force 
compositions since they form the basis for the establishment and use of Unit Type Codes 
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(UTCs) to build AEF/AEW units and specify capabilities.  For an expanded explanation 
of UTCs, see Appendix A. 
To meet the EAF objective of predictability, a 15-month cycle was established as 
shown in Figure 2.2, along with the time periods for the first three AEF cycles.  Each 
cycle consists of five 3-month periods; during each time period, two wings are designated 
as the lead units and are on call to respond to any contingency.  During the remaining 12 
months of the cycle, units will be in a recovery, normal training, or preparation phase (as 
shown in Figure 2.2).  The AEWs are on call every other 4-month time period to ensure 
there is no loss of coverage or contingency response during the AEF deployments.  For 
more information regarding the AEF cycles, see Appendix B. 
 
 
Source:  Aerospace Expeditionary Force, 2000 






AEF Cycle 2 (1 Dec ’00 – 28 Feb ’02) 
AEF 1&2 




1 Dec ’01 – 28 Feb ‘02 
AEF 7&8 
1 Sep ’01 – 30 Nov ‘01 
AEF 5&6
1 Jun ’01 – 31 Aug ‘01 
AEF 3&4
1 Mar ’01 – 31 May ‘01 
Recovery 





2.5  TEAM CONCEPTS 
In the two years and three months since the Air Force began deploying under the 
AEF concept, enough troops have deployed to warrant evaluation of team integrity and 
team cohesion under the AEF deployment process.  This is an area in which little 
research has been conducted.  Still, studies conducted by universities, private agencies, 
and the US Army gives some insight into how the two would be expected to relate.  
Therefore, this section reviews the concept of team dynamics to explain the intended 
benefits of teaming concepts associated with the AEF deployment process. 
Individuals form teams for a variety of different reasons.  It may be to satisfy 
security, social, and esteem needs; or it may be because of proximity or attraction.  
Proximity refers to the physical distance between workers performing a function while 
attraction designates the degree to which people are drawn to each other because of 
perceptual, attitudinal, performance, or motivational similarity (Gibson, et al, 1997).  
Organizations also recognize the advantages of forming and building teams.  Gibson, et 
al. (1997:212) states that organizations form teams to enhance productivity, flatten 
organizations, diversify the workforce, improve quality, create greater flexibility and 
decision making, and to increase customer satisfaction.  Ideally, lead AEF wings are 
deploying individuals who have worked and trained together and are familiar with each 
team member’s strengths and weaknesses.  In essence, the AEF wings are deploying 
teams (or “work-groups”) comprising individuals who communicate, socially interact, 
and train with each other on a daily basis. 
Understanding team dynamics allows Air Force leaders to be familiar with how 
and why teams may or may not perform in a variety of different environments.  It also 
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provides leaders an understanding of a team’s behavior at various stages in its life cycle.  
One model, explored by Holpp (1999) and Gersick (1988), is how teams typically go 
through four stages of development: forming, storming, norming, and performing.  
Typical characteristics of the forming stage include individuals experiencing excitement, 
anxiety, and a feeling of power as teammates become familiar with one another (Holpp, 
1999).  The forming stage is critical from an Air Force AEF perspective; ideally, this 
stage is complete prior to the deployment so units are better prepared to perform their 
mission.  After the work-group is formed, the storming stage is highlighted by ego, 
personality, and differences in opinion that lead to increased levels of frustration.  During 
this phase, ideas are proposed and challenged, plans are laid and revised, and new 
directions are put forward and evaluated (Holpp, 1999).  The norming phase develops 
gradually through team consensus and understanding as team members grow accustomed 
to each other and understand each individual’s strengths and weaknesses (Holpp, 1999).  
Finally, the performing phase is the stage at which work is accomplished effectively and 
efficiently.  This phase is characterized by clear relationships and a consensus as to the 
team’s goals and objectives. 
As a team develops, team building is critical to the maturity of the team.  Gibson 
et al. (1997:240) defines team building as “encouraging people who work together to 
meet as a group in order to identify common goals, improve communications, and resolve 
conflicts.”  The purpose of teambuilding is to allow teams to more effectively accomplish 
tasks while improving their overall performance (Woodman et al., 1980).  It can be 
promoted by exercises designed to help individuals learn the importance of mutual trust 
and cooperation (Yukl, 1998). 
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Team training is another important aspect of team building.  It helps team 
members share ideas and experiences, build group identity, understand the dynamics of 
interpersonal relationships, and get to know each other’s strengths and weaknesses (Noe 
et al, 1997).  Designed to coordinate the performance of individual team members to 
achieve a common goal or objective, team training is particularly imperative when 
information must be shared between members to increase performance. 
Team dynamics and the team building process are essential to the success of the 
EAF concept.  It is important to mission effectiveness that AEF units bond together and 
begin producing results as quickly as possible.  Time, a critical element in military 
operations, must be efficiently used.  Therefore, it is important to understand how various 
factors impact team cohesion. 
 
2.6  CONSTRUCT MODEL AND THEORIES 
The Air Force has implemented a new deployment strategy with the idea of 
increasing team cohesion and team effectiveness.  There is concern, and a need, to ensure 
the AEF deployment process maintains team integrity by fostering team cohesion, which 
in turn should increase individuals’ perceptions of team effectiveness.  To date, these 
aspects of the deployment process have not been evaluated.   
Current group and team literature, and theory, implies that team cohesion 
facilitates and enables team performance.  The framework behind the proposed research 
model is shown in Figure 2.3 in an attempt to capture the critical constructs.  The model 
consists of the following elements all derived from previously completed literature: (a) 
individual anxiety; (b) group unity; (c) work-group characteristics; (d) deployment 
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commitment; (e) team cohesion; (f) perceived team effectiveness; (g) job satisfaction; 
and (h) organizational commitment.  For example, the deployment rules and regulations 
devised by the AEF Center guide the overall AEF deployment policy.  Additionally, 
mission requirements dictate new policies exogenous to the deployment process.  
Because of these exogenous reasons, the AEF deployment process serves as an input 
device moderating Individual Anxiety, Group Unity, and Work-Group Characteristics.  In 
general, it is believed these variables act together to influence an individual’s 
Deployment Commitment and the level of Team Cohesion they feel.  In turn, the factors 
of Deployment Commitment and Team Cohesion are thought to critically influence 




















     
     













Figure 2.3.  Predicted Thesis Model 
 
AEF Team Deployment Process 
It is clear that the theoretical model of the AEF team deployment process is built 
on the premise that increased predictability, response, and team integrity produces a 
uniform deployment structure.  This reinforces the suggestion that the AEF team 
deployment process appears to affect Team Cohesion and, ultimately, perceived Team 
Effectiveness.  Further evidence is found in the work of Latour (1999) and Marston 






























to build an effective military unit.  A review of historical After Action Reports (AARs) 
and Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) found that units also recognized 
the benefits of deploying individuals as teams on their respective AEF deployments as 
indicated in the following excerpt: 
 
The AEF is designed to ensure members who train together (at their 
respective home stations), deploy to the same site, at the same time.  
We now have the means to organize, train, exercise, prepare, deploy, 
and recover as cohesive teams.  If properly developed, this process 
will improve our combat capabilities, and synchronize wing plans, 
improving predictability and stability for our airmen and their 
families (JULL# 02922-34029, August 2000). 
 
 
The AEF benefits to team integrity are based on numerous studies concluding that 
team members generally work better in groups than alone.  In a military environment, 
Sterling et al. (1982) found that less team cohesion was present as the number of 
individuals was increased from squad to platoon to battalion levels.  In other words, 
smaller work-groups displayed a higher degree of team cohesion.  Barker et al. (1991:8) 
state that most scholars agree the smallest number to be defined as a group is three and 
that the maximum group size will depend on the maturity of the group, the style of 
leadership, and the personalities of the group.  To translate the Army study into an Air 
Force perspective, the Army squad could be viewed as an Air Force flight.  Similarly, the 
Army platoon and battalion could be viewed as an Air Force squadron or an Air Force 
group.  Along the same lines, the AEF team deployment process strives to maintain team 
integrity by deploying as many individuals as possible to an AOR from the same lead 
wing.  This is accomplished through the use of small work-groups (UTCs) that, 
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Individual Anxiety.  It appears that Individual Anxiety could influence Team 
Cohesion either negatively or positively, dependent upon whether or not the individual is 
familiar with the deployed AEF team members.  It is expected that individuals with a 
high level of anxiety will perceive lower team cohesion than individuals who have a low 
level of anxiety.  Additionally, Van Dyne et al. (1994) found that Individual Anxiety 
influences Deployment Commitment, which may affect the Perceived Team 
Effectiveness construct.  For example, an individual with high anxiety about a 
forthcoming deployment may not be fully committed to deploying.  This lowered 
deployment commitment may then negatively affect perceived team effectiveness.  
Finally, an individuals’ anxiety is expected to relate to whether or not he or she feels 
unified with the deploying work-group.  That is, individuals who have a high degree of 
anxiety will probably not feel unified with their deploying group. 
In summary, Figure 2.4 shows that if Individual Anxiety is at a low level because 
individuals are deploying as a group with people with whom they are familiar, then both 
Team Cohesion and Team Effectiveness will be high.  Alternatively, if Individual 
Anxiety is high because individuals are deploying by themselves, then both Team 
Cohesion and Team Effectiveness will be lower.  To that end, the following hypothesis 
was postulated: 
Hypothesis 1:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups experience higher individual anxiety than troops who deploy as a group with 





     
     
         
Figure 2.4.  Anxiety Construct Model 
 
Group Unity.  Yukl (1998) defines group unity as a group where subordinates 
obtain psychological support from each other when required.  Millitello et al. (2000:153) 
reinforce this definition of engaging all members by referring to group unity as the extent 
to which the group members work and accept responsibility for reaching the group’s 
goals.  Voight et al. (2001) found that groups rated team building as being “very helpful” 
in enhancing group unity.  Their study implicates that structured group building is helpful 
in establishing group unity (Voight et al., 2001).  This is comparable to how the AEF 
deployment process is designed to build teams at home bases prior to deployment.  
Extrapolating their study further, group unity appears to influence the team cohesion 
construct via the input variables of work-group characteristics and individual anxiety.  It 
is believed that the deployment of work-group UTCs, from the scheduled AEF lead 
wings, will provide enough group unity to preclude any anxiety an individual may 












Hypothesis 2:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-




Work-Group Characteristics.  Offermann et al. (2001:380) defined a work-group as any 
identifiable group of persons within an organization charged with accomplishing 
organizational tasks.  Campion et al. (1993) found that potency, social support, and 
communication and cooperation are important characteristics of work-groups that 
positively influence the team cohesion construct.  Of these three team effectiveness 
characteristics, potency appears to be the least understood and researched.  Potency is the 
belief by a group that it can be effective (Campion et al., 1993).  Essentially, it is the 
team spirit aspect of a work-group.  It has been observed that groups with team spirit 
(potency) are more committed and willing to work hard for the overall good of the group, 
but little research on potency has been conducted (Guzzo et al., 1993).  High team spirit 
would indicate that a work-group is more cohesive. 
 Social support is also an important aspect of work-groups.  Team cohesion may 
be enhanced when members help each other and have positive social interactions 
(Campion et al., 1993).  Additionally, Harkins (1987) and Zajonc (1965) found 
empirically that social support enhances team effectiveness by sustaining effort on 
mundane tasks.  Harkins (1987) showed that social support relies on common variables 
such as evaluation from peers, presence of others, and personal identifiability.  Zajonc 
(1965) found that people performing alone do better on simple tasks but worse on 
complex tasks than when performing in the presence of other people or with co-workers.  
Yukl (1998) reinforces the need for social support, stating the development of cohesive 
groups is more likely if the members get to know each other on a personal basis.  This 
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aspect is extremely important in contingency environments and should be attained by 
personnel prior to deploying on an AEF. 
Finally, the communication and cooperation found in work-groups and teams is a 
critical aspect of overall team effectiveness.  Effective teams learn how to communicate 
and cooperate at an early stage of their development (Holpp, 1999).  This contributes to a 
fair and equitable distribution of the team’s workload (Campion et al., 1993).  The 
following hypothesis is proposed based on all three aspects of Work-Group 
Characteristics: 
Hypothesis 3:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower work-group characteristics than troops who deploy as a 
group with familiar work-groups. 
 
Deployment Commitment 
 Limited research exists supporting deployment commitment in a military 
environment.  However, to overcome this lack of literature, a study by Van Dyne et al. 
(1994) concerning organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) was used.  Van Dyne et al. 
(1994) presented a three-factor OCB model designed to assess how devoted employees 
are to their respective organization.  Van Dyne et al. (1994) conducted confirmatory 
factor analysis that resulted in the confirmation of three specific OCB categories: 
participation, loyalty, and obedience.  Additionally, they found that loyalty had the 
strongest and most uniform pattern of full mediation (Van Dyne et al., 1994).  That is, 
loyalty was a strong identifier of allegiance to the organization.  This allegiance to the 
organization was then extrapolated to deployment commitment for purposes of this study. 
To accomplish that extrapolation, reviews of the loyalty scale items appear to 
accurately measure the commitment levels military individuals may have toward 
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deployments.  Based on the study’s results, it appears that the deployment commitment 
construct would act as a mediator between the AEF deployment process construct and the 
perceived team effectiveness construct.  Based on the literature review of Deployment 
Commitment, the following hypotheses are proposed for this study: 
Hypothesis 4a:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower deployment commitment than troops who deploy as a group 
with familiar work-groups. 
 
Hypothesis 4b:  The relationship between deployment commitment and perceived 
team effectiveness will be moderated by whether or not troops deploy as individuals or 
groups from their respective wings. 
 
Team Cohesion. 
The concept of team cohesion has been found to influence military effectiveness 
and is what fosters the “Lead Wing AEF” mentality.  Vecchio (1988) found that 
cohesiveness is the extent to which members are attracted to a group and desire to remain 
in it.  Additionally, it is sometimes described as the sum of all forces acting on 
individuals to remain in the group.  Individuals tend to regard closeness in groups as 
cohesion.  This camaraderie is generally regarded as “a force acting on the group 
members to remain in a group that is greater than the forces pulling the members away 
from the group” (Gibson et al., 1997: 208). 
Currently, AEF units are expected to arrive at their forward operating base 
prepared to conduct full operations within three to seven days of arrival (Nowak, 1999).  
To accomplish this goal successfully, team members should work harmoniously together.  
It has been found that individuals from the same base work better together due to their 
previous proximity because they have numerous opportunities to exchange ideas, 
thoughts, and attitudes about various on- and off-the-job activities (Gibson et al., 1997).  
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This cohesiveness can be attributed to several characteristics found to be inherent in how 
individuals perceive team cohesion. 
Widmeyer et al. (1985) found that Task Cohesion, Social Cohesion, and 
Individual Attraction to the Group influenced how individuals perceived team cohesion.  
Task Cohesion can be viewed as an individual’s motivation toward achieving the 
organization’s goals and objectives, while Social Cohesion refers to an individual’s 
motivation to develop and maintain social relationships within the group (Widmeyer et 
al., 1985).  Individual Attraction to the Group was defined as the desire of individual 
members to stay in the group.  It deals with the connectedness, bonding, and sticking 
together an individual feels toward the team or work-group (Widmeyer et al., 1985).  To 
that end, the following two hypotheses are postulated for this research: 
Hypothesis 5a:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower team cohesion than troops who deploy as a group with 
familiar work-groups. 
 
Hypothesis 5b:  The relationship between team cohesion and perceived team 
effectiveness will be moderated by whether or not troops deploy as individuals or groups 
from their respective wings. 
 
Outcome Variables 
Perceived Team Effectiveness.  Effective teamwork can often be the difference 
between success and failure (Voight et al., 2001).  However, it is difficult to measure 
team effectiveness without concrete metrics.  Because these metrics are beyond the scope 
of this study, individuals’ perceptions regarding team effectiveness during AEF 
deployments will be measured.  Team effectiveness has been described as the outcome of 
dynamic processes reflected in coordination and a communication process that teams 
develop over time (Hackman, 1983).  Bower (2000) found that team effectiveness does 
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not appear to be influenced by team composition in terms of individual ability, 
personality, ethnicity, and gender.  Whether composed of similar individuals with similar 
qualities (homogenous) or dissimilar individuals with dissimilar qualities 
(heterogeneous), teams perform equally well when time is not an issue.  However, Bower 
(2000) found that homogenous teams significantly outperformed heterogeneous teams on 
performance tasks.  That is, on tasks that involved being completed in a short period of 
time, homogenous teams accomplished the task in a more timely, and efficient, manner.  
This implies that as teams move through the time continuum, the differences between the 
teams play a smaller and smaller role in how effective they will be.  This is very 
important in the AEF Lead Wing mentality.  This pre-existing team familiarity 
(homogeneity) found in the potency, social support, and communication and cooperation 
of the lead wing team should promote high team effectiveness in any environment.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 6:  Individuals who deployed from the same AEF lead wing 
(homogeneous work-group) will exhibit higher perceived team effectiveness than 
individuals who deployed from different wings (heterogeneous work-group) on their 
respective AEF rotation. 
 
Finally, another purpose of the study will be to examine how long it typically 
takes the individual to adjust to and feel cohesively part of the established team.  
Anecdotally, it appears that the sooner an individual can feel part of the team, the sooner 
they should be able to contribute to the perceived group effectiveness.  Barker et al. 
(1991:9) state that groups which meet and interact over a period of time gain maturity 
and communication skills difficult to obtain in a temporary group.  It is thought that 
groups that have an opportunity to meet prior to a deployment, that is deploying from the 
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same lead wing, will generally take less time to gain the maturity and communication 
skills required to effectively perform in a timely manner.  This body of literature 
reinforces the need for individuals to form effective working groups as rapidly as 
possible.  To that end, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 7:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups, will take longer, on average, to feel as if they are part of the deployed team than 




III.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the research design, sample, and data collection medium 
used during this research.  Additionally, it explains how the web-based survey was 
created and distributed to the randomly selected population.  Finally, the data measures 
and statistical analysis tools are discussed. 
 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is based on hypothesized causal relationships between the 
independent variable, the newly implemented Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) 
team deployment process, and the dependent variables, team cohesion and perceived 
team effectiveness.  It is expected that all variables in the proposed model are correlated.  
This reasoning is supported by the existing literature and the proposed hypothetical 
constructs expanded upon in Chapter 2. 
Data were collected using a web-based questionnaire.  The questionnaire was 
chosen due to its low cost, ease of application, and reliability.  Questionnaires usually 
consist of many items that, when combined, produce more reliable measures than would 
any single item (Dooley, 2001).  The worldwide dispersion of subjects (in this case Air 
Force personnel stationed literally around the globe) renders a telephone or face-to-face 
survey impractical (Dooley, 2001). 
Sampling methods are designed to provide estimates with minimum error and 
maximum confidence (Dooley, 2001).  The population was derived from the Air Force 
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Personnel Center (AFPC) personnel database acquired through the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) Mission Support Squadron’s personnel systems manager.  The 
sampling frame was dictated by the completeness and accuracy of the enumeration.  It is 
estimated that approximately 100,000 AEF Cycle 2 and AEF Cycle 3 personnel are 
assigned to the Lead Wings, Lead Mobility Wings, and Aerospace Expeditionary Wings 
for these deployment rotations.  Lists of all assigned personnel to the specific rotation 
were generated.  For example, AEF Cycle 2, rotation 5, was the 355th Wing located at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB).  The AFIT Mission Support Squadron’s 
personnel systems manager queried the AFPC personnel database to return all individuals 
assigned to the 355th Wing.  For complete delineation of the research population, see 
Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1.  Research Population Delineation 
Population - All airmen assigned to AEF Cycles 2  
  and 3 (rotation 1/2) 
Enumeration - All airmen assigned to AEF Cycle 2,  
  who have deployed on rotations 5/6,  
  7/8, or 9/10 
- All airmen assigned to AEF Cycle 3  
  rotation 1/2 
Sampling Frame - Most Updated/Current Enumeration 
Element - Individual airmen assigned to AEF  
  Cycle 2 rotations 5/6, 7/8, 9/10 
- Individual airmen assigned to AEF  
  Cycle 3 rotation 1/2 




 3.3  SAMPLE 
3.3.1  Sample Size.  When evaluating data using linear regression techniques, the 
required sample size depends on variables such as desired power, alpha level, number of 
predictors, and expected effect size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  A simple rule of thumb 
is N >= 50 + 8m (m is the number of independent variables) for testing the multiple 
correlation and N >= 104 + m for testing individual predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996).   These rules of thumb assume a medium-size relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, α = 0.05 and β = 0.20 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996).  If both correlation and individual independent variables are examined, N 
must be calculated using both methods and then the larger of number of cases must be 
used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
General guidelines also exist when conducting factor analysis.  For example, 
Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest sample sizes of 50 as very poor, 100 as poor, 200 as fair, 
300 as good, 500 as very good, and 1000 as excellent.  As a general rule of thumb, it is 
comforting to have at least 300 cases for factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Based on the above logic, and planning the largest sample size, a minimum of 300 
responses was required for this study to adequately conduct all projected statistical 
analysis.  Generally, the larger the value of the sample size (n), the more validity, 
reliability, and normality the responses will provide (Devore, 2000).  As stated by Devore 
(2000), if the sample size (n) is greater than or equal to 30, the Central Limit Theorem 
(CLT) can be invoked.  An advantage of invoking the CLT is that if the sample size (n) is 
sufficiently large, both the sum and the average of the means and variances will provide a 
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normal distribution (Devore, 2000).  Another advantage of achieving high sample sizes is 
that larger samples have less variability than smaller ones (Dooley, 2001). 
3.3.2  Sample Description.  The population includes all U.S. Air Force personnel 
who deployed in support of AEF Cycle 2 rotations from 1 January 2001 to 28 February 
2002 and who are scheduled to support AEF Cycle 3 rotations from 1 March 2002 to 31 
May 2002.  This time period was selected to measure the perceptions of individuals 
scheduled to deploy within a 12-month period.  It was expected that individuals who 
deployed prior to 1 January 2001 would not accurately recall their pre-deployment and 
deployment experiences.  A portion of AEF Cycle 3 was included to gather pre-
deployment perceptions of individuals within three months of their scheduled 
deployments.  It was expected that these individuals would have the greatest amount of 
pre-deployment stress or anxiety.  The sample consisted of randomly selected groups that 
had either recently returned from AEF deployments or were projected to deploy. 
Surveys collect data from units, usually individual respondents, called elements 
(Dooley, 2001).  In this research study, the elements were randomly selected from the 
population of projected and previously deployed AEF Cycle 2 and 3 airmen.  In an effort 
to complete the sample, the two AEWs were included.  It was expected these individuals 
deployed to augment possible shortfalls experienced during the AEF rotations.  
Additionally, it was important to measure the perceptions of these individuals prior to 
their potential deployments.  It is expected that by incorporating these individuals into the 
survey population, whether they deployed or not, it will add to the reliability, validity, 





 Table 3.2.  AEF Cycle and Rotation Sample 
Cycle Rotation Lead/Mobility/AEW Wing Deployment Dates 
5 355th WG Davis-Monthan AFB 
6 20th FW Shaw AFB 
5/6 22nd ARW McConnell AFB 
 
 
- 1 June 2001 - 31 August  
  2001 
7 27th FW Cannon AFB 
8 28th BW Ellsworth AFB 
7/8 319th ARW Grand Forks AFB 
 
- 1 September 2001 – 30  
  November 2001 
9 2nd BW Barksdale AFB 
10 1st FW Langley AFB 
AEF  
Cycle 2 
9/10 92nd ARW Fairchild AFB 
 
- 1 December 2001 – 28  
  February 2002 
1 388th FW Hill AFB 
2 7th BW Dyess AFB 
AEF  
Cycle 3 
1/2 43rd AW Pope AFB 
 
- 1 March 2002 – 31 May  
  2002 
Overlap 
 
366th WG Mountain Home 
AFB 
- 1 December 2000 – 31  
  March 2001 
- 1 August 2001 – 30  
  November 2001 AEW 
Overlap 
 
4th FW Seymour-Johnson 
AFB 
- 1 April 2001 – 31 July 2001 
- 1 December 2001 – 31  
  March 2002 
 
 
To ensure representation from each base and rotation, a simple random sampling 
technique was used independently at each base to generate the sample.  At each location, 
every assigned military member was systematically assigned a separate and unique 
number.  Microsoft Excel’s random number generator function was then used to choose 
the sample.  Random sampling provides the best way of achieving equal-probability 
sampling (Dooley, 2001).  Additionally, random sampling is the best sampling method to 
achieve high internal validity (Dooley, 2001).  The random number generator, set in the 
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uniform distribution position, rendered a relatively simple method to achieve equal-
probability sampling.  For example, 400 individuals were randomly selected in this 
manner from the 3,143 personnel assigned to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in AEF 
Cycle 2. 
 
3.4  DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
Data was collected using a wide variety of methods.  The following sections 
highlight these various data collection methods.  For complete data collection delineation 
see Table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3.  Data Collection Method 
Type of Collection Medium: Data/Narratives Reviewed For: 
 
Web-Based Electronic Mail Survey 
- AEF Team Deployment Process 
- Team Integrity 
- Team Cohesion 
- Team Effectiveness 
 
Archival Record Review (AEF Center) 
- AEF Team Deployment Process 
- Team Integrity 
- Team Cohesion 
- Team Effectiveness 
 
Number of Observation Periods 
- One time survey 
- One time collection of archival data from 
   the AEF Center 
 
Specific Research Design 





3.4.1  Survey Construction.  A 119-item questionnaire, included at Appendix C 
with its survey control number, was administered as part of a larger study designed to 
examine different aspects of the AEF team deployment process.  For purposes of this 
study, a portion of the questionnaire was designed to measure individual perceptions of 
how the AEF team deployment process affected team cohesion and perceived team 
effectiveness.  For purposes of a related but independent study, a portion of the survey 
was designed to measure perceptions of work-family conflict and predictability.  The 
survey also provided unlimited space for individuals to comment about their perceptions 
of the AEF deployment process and the value of the survey. 
Survey data responses were based on Likert-type scales.  The most common 
method for creating a composite score in social research simply sums the responses to 
items composed with Likert-style wording (Dooley, 2001).  One of the advantages of 
using the Likert scale is that each item scored receives equal weighting for each question 
(Dooley, 2001).  That is each item, regardless of the respondent’s answer, contributes to 
the overall scale-item response.  Likert items are composed of statements designed to 
evaluate to what level the respondent agrees or disagrees with the question.  
Questionnaire responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
3.4.2  Survey Administration.  To collect the perceptions of deploying individuals, 
a web-based survey was created.  The web page was created using Microsoft FrontPage 
2000 computer software.  Additionally, a Microsoft Access 2000 database was created to 
interface and store data generated from the web-survey.  Electronic mail (e-mail) 
addresses were then created using the standard Air Force e-mail address format of 
Firstname.Lastname@airforcebase.af.mil.  All randomly selected survey participants 
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were e-mailed the web-page link to the web-based survey in December 2001.  These 
surveys were sent via e-mail to the airman’s current billet assignment.  These airmen 
were allowed four weeks to complete and return the survey back to the researcher. 
3.4.3  Archival Record Review.  Supplemental data came from archival records 
dated 1 October 1999 to 1 January 2002 at the AEF Center in November 2001.  The AEF 
Center collects, maintains, and updates all After Action Reports (AARs) and Joint 
Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) reports within 60 days of the conclusion of a 
lead AEF wing’s deployment.  These records and reports were reviewed to ensure all 
aspects of the AEF team deployment process, to include pre-deployment issues, were 
captured in this research.  Other pertinent documents include AEF pre- and post-
conference minutes and documented AEF feedback sessions.  All documents were 
evaluated to help determine whether the new AEF team deployment process increases 
deployed team cohesion and perceived team effectiveness as hypothesized.  These 
records were reviewed for topics concerning team integrity, team cohesion, and team 
effectiveness with the intent to compare these statements with the proposed hypothetical 
constructs and with the AEF survey results. 
 
3.5  MEASURES 
Measures were created for each construct proposed in the hypothetical model.  
These measures, derived from previous studies, were designed to accurately reflect the 




3.5.1  Individual Anxiety.  To determine the effect of anxiety on deployments, a 
pre-deployment measure was created to determine the difference in individual anxiety 
levels between individuals deploying by themselves and individuals deploying as teams 
from the same base.  The measure consisted of survey scale-items 66 through 68.  An 
example question is, “The thought of this deployment worries/worried me.” 
3.5.2  Group Unity/Familiarization.  A measure was created to determine how 
well individuals knew one another prior to and during the deployment.  For purposes of 
this study, the term “work-group” was defined as “individuals from your home station 
with whom you work on a daily basis to accomplish your work mission or objectives.”  
This was done to provide the respondent a frame of reference upon which to base their 
response.  It is assumed that this work-group would be the smallest, most familiar group 
of individuals with which the respondent would be the most familiar at their respective 
bases. 
Survey scale-items 54 through 56 were used from a previous study conducted by 
Campion et al., (1995) to measure the group unity construct.  Campion et al., (1995) 
reported an inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) of 0.90 on their scale.  Two 
questions were reworded slightly to specify specific Air Force related terminology.  For 
example, survey question 54 had the words “home station work-group” added.  
Additionally, survey question 55 had the words “AEF work-group” to delineate which 
group the respondent should consider when answering the question. 
Additionally, two objective questions, survey items 108 and 109, were asked of 
the subjects.  One question, “If you are scheduled to deploy, how many people from your 
home station work-group are scheduled to deploy to the same location?” was designed to 
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determine the number of familiar people with whom the individual deployed.  The second 
question attempts to determine what percent of an individual’s home station work-group 
actually deployed: “How many people make up your home station work-group?”  Based 
on the calculated percentage, the researcher can infer how well the individuals in the 
work-group knew one another prior to the deployment. 
3.5.3  Work-Group Characteristics.  To measure Work-Group Characteristics, a 
three factor, nine-item scale was developed based on the measure of work-groups by 
Campion et al.’s (1995).  This scale was designed to assess the team member’s 
perceptions of specific characteristics of their work-group.  The three characteristics 
evaluated for this research were Potency or Spirit of the Work-Group, Work-Group 
Social Support, and Communication/Cooperation within the Work-Group.  Campion et 
al., (1995) reported an inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) of 0.80, 0.78, and 0.81 
for these characteristics, respectively.  An example scale-item from Campion et al. 
(1995) for Potency/Spirit of the Work-Group was, “Members of my team have great 
confidence that the team can perform effectively.”  To further define the specific team the 
individuals should consider when answering the questionnaire, the original item was 
reworded slightly to read as, “I have confidence that my deployed work-group can 
perform effectively.”  Other questions within the measure were also reworded to further 
define specific work-group definitions.  Survey scale-items 57 through 65 comprise the 
work-group characteristics measure. 
3.5.4  Deployment Commitment.   To determine an individual’s Deployment 
Commitment, a three-item scale based upon the four-factor model presented by Van 
Dyne et al. (1994) was used.  This measure was designed to assess how committed team 
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members are to deployments in general.  Van Dyne et al. (1994) reported an inter-item 
reliability of 0.75 for the original measure.  An example scale-item from Van Dyne et al. 
(1994) was, “I avoid extra duties and responsibilities at work.”  To define this item from 
a military perspective, the original item was reworded to read as, “I try to avoid 
deployments when possible.”  Survey scale-items 92 through 94 were used to measure 
deployment commitment. 
3.5.5  Team Cohesion.  The three-factor model presented by Carless and De Paola 
(2000) was used to measure Team Cohesion.  The Carless and De Paola (2000) model 
consists of twelve items measuring Task Cohesion (four items), Social Cohesion (four 
items), and Individual Attraction to the Group (four items).  Task Cohesion is considered 
the extent of an individual’s motivation toward achieving the organization’s goals and 
objectives (Widmeyer et al., 1985).  Social Cohesion refers to an individual’s motivation 
to develop and maintain social relationships within the group (Widmeyer et al., 1985).  
Individual Attraction to the Group is defined as the desire of individual members to stay 
in the group and the properties of the group as a whole (i.e., connectedness, bonding, and 
sticking together) (Widmeyer et al., 1985).  Carless and De Paola (2000) found inter-item 
reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.74 for Task Cohesion, 0.81 for Social Cohesion, and 
0.63 for Individual Attraction to the Group. 
The items were altered by the researcher in three ways to improve the 
applicability of the scale-item measures to this study.  First, references to the team were 
replaced with wording that specifically referred to the deployed team.  For example, an 
original Carless and De Paola (2000) item stated as, “Our team is united in trying to reach 
its goals for performance” was rephrased to read as, “Our deployed team is united in 
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trying to succeed.”  Second, Carless and De Paola (2000) reverse coded six items in their 
original questionnaire.  In an attempt to improve wording and increase reliability, three of 
the items were reworded positively leaving only three reverse coded items.  For example, 
the original item reads, “I’m unhappy with my team’s level of commitment to the task.”   
The item now reads, “I’m happy with my deployed team’s level of commitment to the 
mission.”  Third, two items were added to the Individual Attraction to the Group factor.  
This was done in an attempt to increase the reliability from the 0.63 alpha coefficient 
(Cronbach’s alpha) reported in the Carless and De Paola (2000) study.  Survey scale-
items 80 through 91 were used to measure the team cohesion construct. 
3.5.6  Perceived Team Effectiveness.  To measure Perceived Team Effectiveness, 
a five-item scale was devised using a study by Carless (1995).  This scale was designed 
to assess how effective the team members perceived their deployed team had been at 
accomplishing the organization’s goals and objectives.  An example scale-item from 
Carless (1995) was, “Compared to other units I have known, the effectiveness of my 
current team is excellent.”  To further define the specific team the individuals should 
consider when answering the questionnaire, the original item was reworded to read as, 
“Compared to other work-groups I have been associated with, the effectiveness of my 
work-group on this AEF team deployment was excellent.”  Carless (1995) reported an 
inter-item reliability of 0.94 on the original measure.  Survey scale-items 95 through 99 




3.6  STATISTICAL TOOLS 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 10.1 was used to analyze the 
reported survey data.  SPSS 10.1 proved ideal for analyzing descriptive statistics such as 
means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, and correlations for multi-item models.  
Additionally, it was used to perform inter-item reliabilities of the proposed constructs.  
SPSS 10.1 was also used for data reduction, exploratory factor analysis, and linear 
regression.  An advantage of exploratory factor analysis is that it can be used to test a 
hypothetical model (Carless et al., 2000).  Additionally, exploratory factor analysis 
provides a formal test of how well the observed data fit a hypothetical model (Gerbing & 
Hamilton, 1996; Stevens, 1995), takes into account measurement error (Byrne, 1998), 
and permits comparison of competing models (Bollen, 1989; Loehlin, 1992). 
A limitation to using SPSS 10.1 is its inability to measure the effect size of the 
interaction between proposed variables.  However, effect size of interactions between 
variables and constructs is often very difficult to measure regardless of the type of 
statistical analysis tool.  The researcher feels SPSS 10.1 is applicable in this study due to 
the intuitively high correlations present between the proposed hypothetical constructs. 
Additionally, SPSS 10.1 was used for analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical 
software and regression analysis.  ANOVA refers broadly to a collection of experimental 
situations and statistical procedures for the analysis of quantitative responses from 
experimental units (Devore, 2000).  The ANOVA test used in this research focused on 
the comparison of two or more variables.  Regression analysis is the part of statistics that 
deals with investigation of the relationship between two or more variables related in a 
non-deterministic fashion (Devore, 2000).  The use of a scattergram, coupled with a 
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“Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient,” was used to establish the linear 
regression test.  The results of linear regression data analysis may, among other validity 
and reliability outcomes, be used to explain variability between variables.  The statistical 
results provide the framework for internal and external validity measures in the research 
study. 
 
3.7  METHODOLOGY SUMMATION 
This research design involved a cross-sectional, web-based survey of projected 
and previously deployed airmen who deployed under the AEF team deployment process.  
The survey was designed to measure individual perceptions of the AEF team deployment 
process, team cohesion, and perceived team effectiveness constructs discussed in earlier 
chapters.  Additionally, archival AEF reports and records were reviewed and evaluated.  
The results from the survey were evaluated statistically to determine construct 




IV.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the results of the data collection phase.  First, it provides 
survey response rates and then describes the results of the descriptive statistics returned 
in the web-based survey responses.  Next, confirmatory factor analyses and 
corresponding inter-item reliability analyses were conducted to determine if the scale-
items were measuring the intended constructs.  Finally, linear regression was conducted 
to determine how the independent variables affected the dependent variables along the 
various paths. 
 
4.2  SURVEY RESPONSE 
Of the 6,400 electronic mail (e-mail) surveys sent, a total of 1,560 e-mails were 
returned as undeliverable.  This corresponds to an undeliverable rate of 24.38 percent, a 
rate comparable to that reported by Wynne (2001).  Wynne (2001) found that 
approximately 25 percent of the e-mails sent in his web-based survey did not reach the 
intended subject.  This is thought to be primarily due to erroneous e-mail addresses, 
permanent changes of station, and attrition. 
Of those that were delivered, 1,234 people (a response rate of 25.58%) completed 
the questionnaire.  The Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Center located at Langley 
Air Force Base, acting as a sponsor for the research effort, emphasized the importance of 
this research to the respondents.  Therefore, a high level of cooperation was expected.  
These results correspond to e-mailed, web-based surveys conducted by Obruba (2001) 
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and Wynne (2001).  They found that of the e-mails that actually reached the destination, 
approximately 23 and 27 percent, respectively, were returned as responses. 
In any study, it is important to determine the generalizability of the research.  This 
is accomplished to ensure the survey responses mirror the AEF structure and, ultimately, 
the Air Force population.  To determine whether the collected survey responses 
accurately represented the AEF population, comparisons were made between the 
percentage of males and females in the Air Force, the marital status of Air Force 
personnel, and the percentage of officers and enlisted in the Air Force.  The survey 
responses reflect 56.6 percent of the respondents were male, 13.9 percent were female, 
and 29.5 percent did not answer.  Additionally, the survey reflected that 69.5 percent 
were married and 29 percent were single.  Finally, the survey responses reflect that 12.5 
percent were officers and 87.5 percent were enlisted. 
Finally, a test for significance of difference between two proportions (sample and 
population) was conducted on the sample returns for officer/enlisted personnel and 
married/single personnel.  This test is accomplished to determine the significance of a 
difference between the sample and the population (Bruning & Kintz, 1968).  The enlisted 
z-score was 69.69 and the married z-score was 122.25.  These scores indicate that the 
enlisted and officer survey responses are significantly skewed toward the enlisted side, 
indicating a larger number of enlisted personnel, when compared to the Air Force 
population, responded to the questionnaire.  Additionally, the married and single survey 
response is skewed significantly toward married personnel when compared to the Air 
Force population.  These results indicate that the study cannot be completely generalized 
to the Air Force population.  Therefore, caution should be exercised when making 
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inferences between the sample and the population.  See Table 4.1 for the sample to 
population demographic comparison. 
 
Table 4.1.  AEF Sample to Air Force Population Comparison 
 Demographic  
 Male Female Unknown Total 
Number 699 172 363 1234 
Sample Percent 56.6% 13.9% 29.5%  
Air Force* 81% 19%   
 Married Single Unknown Total 
Number 863 352 19 1234 
Sample Percent 69.5% 29% 1.5%  
Air Force* 60% 40%   
 Officer Enlisted Unknown Total 
Number 155 1079 0 1234 
Sample Percent 12.5% 87.5%   
Air Force* 19% 81%   
 
*  Airman Magazine, January 2002 
 
4.3  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As a review, Table 4.2 lists the six constructs hypothesized in the proposed model 
and their corresponding survey questions used to establish the construct relationships.  










Table 4.2.  Constructs and Related Survey Questions 
CONSTRUCT: SURVEY QUESTIONS: 
Individual Anxiety Questions 66 - 68 
Group Unity Questions 54 - 56 
Work-Group Characteristics Questions 57 - 65 
Deployment Commitment Questions 92 - 94 
Team Cohesion Questions 80 - 91 
Team Effectiveness Questions 95 - 99 
 
* Survey located in Appendix C 
 
 
Sample means and standard deviations appear to be normal for each of the scale-
items in the survey response set.  Additionally, scale-item skewness and kurtosis values 
were reviewed.  Based on the review, the group unity scale-item 1 (survey question 54) 
appears to be approaching the imposed skewness value ceiling of one.  However, since 
this particular scale-item is not over this ceiling, it will be retained for future analysis.  
For complete delineation of the SPSS 10.1 descriptive statistics for each scale-item, see 
Appendix E. 
 
4.4  EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (EFA) 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) evaluated if the scale-items correlated with 
their intended constructs.  To complete the EFA, a direct oblimin, principal axis factor 
analysis was conducted.  During this analysis, the perceived team effectiveness construct 
has been removed since it is the prevailing outcome variable in the model. 
This analysis identified two scale-items that, due to content issues, may not be 
measuring their intended construct.  For example, individual anxiety scale-item number 1 
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(survey question 66) was intended to measure individual anxiety.  However, upon 
conducting the EFA, it appears to be measuring deployment commitment.  To reinforce 
the need to remove this item, the inter-item reliabilities reported higher values if this 
scale-item was removed.  Upon reviewing the question for content, it appears the item is 
worded to lead the subject to consider deployments rather than anxiety.  Therefore, this 
item was removed from the analysis. 
Survey question 82, intended to measure team cohesion, also appears to contain 
content issues as it failed to load on any factors during the analysis.  This item appears to 
be worded in a confusing and ambiguous manner.  Additionally, the inter-item 
reliabilities reported higher values for the team cohesion construct if this item was 
removed.  Based on this review, the item will be removed from this analysis. 
After these items were removed, the EFA was conducted a second time as 
described.  Table 4.3 displays the final factor analysis loadings for the various constructs 
with the aforementioned scale-items removed.  Factors with eigenvalues greater than one 
were used for the final pattern matrix.  Additionally, scale-item loadings are reported for 
absolute values exceeding 0.40 without cross-loadings.  This final factor analysis 
indicated that the survey scale-items measured seven distinct factors.  The first factor 
appeared to highlight group unity/familiarization.  Based on this result, these three items 
were averaged to form the group unity variable used in the model.  The second factor 
appears to measure individual anxiety.  These two scale-items were averaged to provide 
the individual anxiety measure in the model.  The third factor represents work-group 
characteristics.  These nine items were averaged to create the work-group characteristics 
variable used in the model as suggested by Campion et al., (1995).  The fourth, fifth, and 
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sixth factors all loaded on their respective team cohesion factors.  These scale-items were 
combined and averaged to create the team cohesion variable used in the model as 
proposed by Carless and De Paola (2000).  Finally, the seventh factor appears to 
represent deployment commitment.  These three scale-items were averaged to create the 
deployment commitment variable. 
 
Table 4.3.  Exploratory Factor Loadings 
Factor Construct item (Survey question 
number) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Group Unity 1 (54) -0.73       
Group Unity 2 (55) -0.83       
Group Unity 3 (56) -0.85       
Individual Anxiety 2 (67)  0.73      
Individual Anxiety 3 (68)  0.85      
Work-Group Characteristics 1 (57)   0.65     
Work-Group Characteristics 2 (58)   0.76     
Work-Group Characteristics 3 (59)   0.82     
Work-Group Characteristics 4 (60)   0.81     
Work-Group Characteristics 5 (61)   0.58     
Work-Group Characteristics 6 (62)   0.93     
Work-Group Characteristics 7 (63)   0.88     
Work-Group Characteristics 8 (64)   0.72     
Work-Group Characteristics 9 (65)   0.86     
Team Cohesion 1 (80)    -0.64    
Team Cohesion 2 (81)    -0.67    
Team Cohesion 4 (83)    -0.33    
Team Cohesion 5 (84)     0.50   
Team Cohesion 6 (85)     0.60   
Team Cohesion 7 (86)     0.85   
Team Cohesion 8 (87)     0.80   
Team Cohesion 9 (88)      0.71  
Team Cohesion 10 (89)      0.70  
Team Cohesion 11 (90)      0.71  
Team Cohesion 12 (91)      0.45  
Deployment Commitment 1 (92)       0.59
Deployment Commitment 2 (93)       0.78
Deployment Commitment 3 (94)       0.79
 
* Survey questions located in Appendix D 




The next step in the exploratory factor analysis was to evaluate and report the 
inter-item reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) of the various constructs.  Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994) report that Cronbach’s alpha scores greater than 0.60 for newly 
developed scales is good and an alpha score greater than 0.70 for an accepted scale is 
good. 
The group unity measure appears to have reliable scale-items when taken as a 
group (α = 0.86).  When initially computed, the individual anxiety measure appeared to 
have a survey scale-item (66) which lowered the Cronbach’s alpha value to 0.70.  
However, as SPSS 10.1 reports, when that scale-item is removed, the inter-item reliability 
value rises to 0.77.  As previously stated, survey item 66 will be removed in future 
analysis for this research.  Although the individual anxiety construct is the lowest of the 
six inter-item reliabilities, the Cronbach’s alpha score is not deemed too low to warrant 
rejection. 
Recall that the work-group characteristics construct was a one factor, nine-item 
scale composed of potency or spirit of the work-group (α = 0.80), work-group social 
support (α = 0.78), and communication/cooperation within the work-group (α = 0.81) 
(Campion et al., 1995).  Based on the results, all SPSS 10.1 computed alpha coefficients 
for the work-group characteristic measures within that construct exceeded the measures 
reported by Campion et al. (1995).  For example, the group spirit/potency factor achieved 
a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.91.  Additionally, the deployed work-group social support 
and deployed work-group communication and cooperation factors achieved Cronbach’s 
alpha values of 0.87 and 0.92, respectively.  Collectively, the work-group characteristics 
measure achieved an inter-item reliability value of 0.96. 
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Deployment commitment achieved a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.79.  An inter-
inter-item reliability of 0.85 could be realized by removing survey scale-item 92.  
However, this will not be considered due to the strength of the final factor analysis 
pattern matrix.  Additionally, the content of the scale-item appears to be appropriately 
measuring the correct construct.  That is, the scale-item appears to be properly grouped in 
the correct construct.  Therefore, the content analysis reinforces the decision to leave the 
scale-item in statistical analysis. 
Team cohesion achieved an alpha coefficient value of 0.88 by removing survey 
scale-item 82.  As previously discussed, it appears this item was poorly worded, did not 
load on any factor, and was subsequently removed from further analysis due to content 
issues.  Finally, perceived team effectiveness appears to be statistically reliable with an 
alpha coefficient of 0.95.  An alpha coefficient of 0.97 could be realized by removing 
survey scale-item 95, but it will not be removed due to the small increase.  Reinforcing 
this decision is the fact that the content of the question indicates the scale-item should 
remain.  That is, the question appears to be measuring the correct construct.  Inter-item 










  Table 4.4.  Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for all Constructs 
 Descriptives Pearson Correlation 
Measure N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  PTE 643 4.86 1.17 (0.94)      
2.  TC 643 4.38 0.91 0.65** (0.88)     
3.  DC 643 5.25 1.27 0.31** 0.21** (0.79)    
4.  WGC 643 5.15 1.08 0.57** 0.56** 0.30** (0.96)   
5.  IA 643 3.34 1.49 -0.08* -0.01 -0.28** 0.02 (0.77)  
6.  GU 643 5.19 1.29 0.33** 0.34** -0.09* 0.62** 0.13** (0.86) 
 
N = 643, ** p < .001 (two-tailed), * p < .05 (two-tailed) 
Reliability estimates in parentheses along diagonal = Cronbach’s alpha 
*** PTE = Perceived Team Effectiveness; TC = Team Cohesion; DC = Deployment 
Commitment; WGC = Work-Group Characteristics; IA = Individual Anxiety; GU = Group Unity 
 
Table 4.4 also displays the collective descriptive statistical information for the 
proposed model.  A general rule would be to use a correlation value of 0.30 or higher to 
mark a significant relationship between two variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
Pearson correlations appear to confirm the theoretical literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
when evaluating the perceived team effectiveness construct and how it relates to the other 
constructs.  As expected, there appears to be a strong, and significant, correlation 
between team cohesion and perceived team effectiveness.  Additionally, significant 
correlations exist between perceived team effectiveness and deployment commitment, 
work-group characteristics, individual anxiety, and group unity.  It was expected there 
would be negative correlations between individual anxiety and team effectiveness (-0.08), 
team cohesion (-0.01), and deployment commitment (-0.28).  That is, as individual 
anxiety increases, the perceived team effectiveness, team cohesion, and deployment 
commitment all decrease.  Additionally, it was expected that individual anxiety would 
negatively correlate with the group unity construct.  That is, as individual anxiety 
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decreases, the group unity would increase.  The results (r = .13, p < .001) indicated there 
was a significant positive relationship between these two concepts. 
 
4.5  STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine the difference between 
means of the constructs and whether individuals deployed as groups or teams.  
Additionally, the ANOVA analysis was used to determine if specific hypotheses were 
supported or not supported in the research.  Table 4.5 displays the ANOVA analysis 
results.  Each hypothesis will be addressed and a brief explanation of the ANOVA results 
provided. 
 
Recall hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups experience higher individual anxiety than troops who deploy as a group with 
familiar work-groups. 
 
It was expected that the mean of individual anxiety for individuals deploying as a 
group would be lower than the mean of individual anxiety for individuals deploying by 
themselves.  This indeed was the trend observed in the computed means.  That is, the 
mean individual anxiety score for individuals deploying with a group was 3.26 while the 
mean individual anxiety score for individuals deploying by themselves was 3.33.  
However, the F-value of 0.31 (p > .05) was not statistically significant, indicating there 
was not a statistical difference between the two groups.  This finding does not support 




Recall hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower group unity than troops who deploy as a group with familiar 
work-groups. 
 
It was expected that the mean of group unity for individuals deploying as a group 
would be higher than the mean of group unity for individuals deploying by themselves.  
This indeed was observed.  The mean group unity score for individuals deploying by 
themselves was 4.86 while the mean group unity score for individuals deploying as a 
group was 5.41.  This means that individuals deploying as groups perceived higher group 
unity than individuals who deployed by themselves.  Additionally, the F-value of 26.03 
(p < .001) was found to be statistically significant.  This finding supports the proposed 
hypothesis. 
 
Recall hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower work-group characteristics than troops who deploy as a 
group with familiar work-groups. 
 
It was expected that the mean of the 9-item scale of work-group characteristics for 
individuals deploying as a group would be higher than the mean of work-group 
characteristics for individuals deploying by themselves.  The data results confirm this 
expectation.  The mean work-group characteristics score for individuals deploying by 
themselves was 5.06 while the mean work-group characteristics score for individuals 
deploying as a group was 5.32.  This means that individuals deploying as a group 
perceived more work-group characteristics than individuals deploying by themselves.  To 
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further reinforce the hypothesis, the F-value of 8.24 (p < .01) was statistically significant.  
This finding supports the proposed hypothesis. 
 
Recall hypothesis 4a: 
Hypothesis 4a:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower deployment commitment than troops who deploy as a group 
with familiar work-groups. 
 
It was expected that the mean of deployment commitment for individuals 
deploying as a group would be higher than the mean of deployment commitment for 
individuals deploying by themselves.  Surprisingly, this was not the case.  Individuals 
deploying by themselves displayed a higher average (5.41) for deployment commitment 
than individuals deploying as a group (5.37).  In other words, individuals exhibited 
greater deployment commitment than groups.  It was found however that the F-value of 
0.10 was not statistically significant.  This finding does not support the proposed 
hypothesis. 
 
Recall hypothesis 5a: 
Hypothesis 5a:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower team cohesion than troops who deploy as a group with 
familiar work-groups. 
 
It was expected that the mean of team cohesion for individuals deploying as a 
group would be higher than the mean of team cohesion for individuals deploying by 
themselves.  This was indeed found in the data results.  Individuals deploying by 
themselves displayed a lower average (4.33) of team cohesion than individuals deploying 
as a group (4.51).  That is, individuals perceived less team cohesion on deployments than 
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groups.  However, it was found that the F-value of 3.43 was not statistically significant.  
Interestingly, the statistical significance was found to be 0.06, very close to the 
theoretically accepted 0.05 statistical significant limits.  This finding does not support 
the proposed hypothesis. 
 
Recall hypothesis 6: 
Hypothesis 6:  Individuals who deployed from the same AEF lead wing 
(homogeneous work-group) will exhibit higher perceived team effectiveness than 
individuals who deployed from different wings (heterogeneous work-group) on their 
respective AEF rotation. 
 
It was expected that the mean of team effectiveness for individuals deploying as a 
group (homogeneous work-group) would be higher than the mean of team effectiveness 
for individuals deploying by themselves (heterogeneous work-group).  This expectation 
was found in the results.  Individuals deploying by themselves displayed a lower average 
(4.90) for deployed team effectiveness than individuals deploying as a group (5.17).  That 
is, individuals exhibited less perceived team effectiveness than groups on their respective 
deployments.  This is further supported by the F-value of 5.42, which was statistically 











Table 4.5.  ANOVA Results 
Deploy with Group Deploy as Individual   
 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev F(df, df) Supports Hypothesis 
Individual 
Anxiety 3.26 1.42 3.33 1.59 
F(1, 632) 
= 0.31 H1:  No 




H2:  Yes 
Work-Group 
Characteristics 5.32 1.07 5.06 1.11 
F(1, 639) 
= 8.24** H3:  Yes 
Deployment 
Commitment 5.37 1.18 5.41 1.33 
F(1, 451) 
= 0.099 H4a:  No 
Team 
Cohesion 4.51 0.97 4.33 0.93 
F(1, 458) 
= 3.43 H5a:  No 
Team 
Effectiveness 5.17 1.12 4.90 1.18 
F(1, 451) 
= 5.42* H6:  Yes 
 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed); ** p < .01 (two-tailed); * p < .05 (two-tailed) 
 
The next step was to quantitatively evaluate hypotheses 4b and 5b to infer how 
the data compares to the proposed hypotheses.  To accomplish this, hierarchical 
regression was used to determine the relative strength of the relationships between the 
constructs, and to determine if individuals deploying either by themselves or as groups 
moderated the proposed relationships stipulated in the two hypotheses.  Because 
interactions were tested, the problems posed by multicollinearity were examined to 
determine if corrections should be made.  Initial computations showed that the condition 
index values, ranging from 1.00 to 95.03, indicated high multicollinearity was exhibited 
in the interactions.  To correct this situation, centering techniques were used as explained 
by Neter et al. (1996).  Essentially, subtracting the mean value of the old variable away 
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from each construct variable created the newly centered variables.  Table 4.6 displays the 
results of the multicollinearity diagnosis both prior to centering and after centering 
techniques were applied. 
 
Table 4.6.  Variable Multicollinearity Diagnosis 
Variable Condition Index (Pre-Centered) 
Condition Index 
(Post-Centered) 
Team Cohesion 1.00 1.00 
Deployment Commitment 1.00 1.00 
Individual Anxiety 5.27 1.43 
Group Unity 6.12 1.63 
Work-Group Characteristics 11.12 1.72 













After centering all applicable variables, and checking to ensure the condition 
indexes reflected minimal multicollinearity, a three-step hierarchical regression was 
designed to determine the various relationship strengths between deployment 
commitment and team effectiveness.  For example, in step one, the centered deployment 
commitment variable was computed by itself to determine the strength of the relationship 
between it and team effectiveness.  The next step in the regression was designed to see if 
the deployment status affected the deployment commitment and team effectiveness 
relationship.  Therefore, the centered deployment status variable was added to the 
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centered deployment commitment variable to complete step two.  Finally, step three 
evaluated the centered deployment commitment variable, centered deployment status 
variable, and the centered interaction variable composed by multiplying the two 
aforementioned variables.  This was accomplished to determine if the relationship was 
different for individuals deploying as a group versus individuals deploying by 
themselves.  The intent was to explain more variance in the model by determining if 
deploying as a group increased the deployment commitment and team effectiveness 
relationship. 
 
Recall hypothesis 4b: 
Hypothesis 4b:  The relationship between deployment commitment and perceived 
team effectiveness will be moderated by whether or not troops deploy as individuals or 
groups from their respective wings. 
 
According to the hierarchical regression, the deployment commitment and team 
effectiveness relationship was found to have a beta value of 0.36 that was statistically 
significant.  As expected from the literature review discussed in Chapter 2, this confirms 
a positive relationship exists between the two variables of deployment commitment and 
team effectiveness.  Additionally, the R2 value of 0.13 explains 13 percent of the variance 
in the deployment commitment/team effectiveness relationship. 
The next step confirms the hypothesis in that an individual’s deployment status 
does appear to moderate the relationship between deployment commitment and team 
effectiveness.  Additionally, the statistically significant R2 value growing from 0.13 in 
step one to 0.14 in step two confirms that an individual’s deployment status explains 
more of the variance in the model. 
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Finally, step three further confirms that individual deployment status indeed 
moderates the hypothetical relationship.  The interaction variable achieved a statistically 
significant beta value of 0.48.  This indicates that whether individuals deploy by 
themselves or with groups does moderate the relationship.  Additionally, the statistically 
significant R2 value growing from 0.14 in step two to 0.15 in step three confirms that an 
individual’s deployment status explains more of the variance in the model.  Finally, the 
fact that the beta value for deployment commitment decreases from step one to step three 
indicates a moderating variable of deployment status exists within the model.  See Table 


















Table 4.7.  Regression for Deployment Commitment and Team Effectiveness 
 
 
Team Effectiveness/Deployment Status (H4b) 
 
 1 2 3 




β = 0.36***   




 β = 0.36***  
2. Deployment Status 
(Centered)  β = 0.11**  




  β = 0.22** 
2. Deployment Status 






  β = 0.48* 
R2 0.13*** 0.14** 0.15* 
∆R2 -- 0.01** 0.01* 
 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed); ** p < .01 (two-tailed); * p < .05 (two-tailed) 




Using plotting techniques from Aiken and West (1991), the relationship among 
deployment status, deployment commitment, and team effectiveness further elucidates 
the results.  Figure 4.1 shows that an inordinal relationship exists between deployment 
commitment and team effectiveness when comparing the two with an individual’s 
deployment status.  For lower levels of deployment commitment, perceptions of team 
effectiveness are lower for those that deployed as a group than those that deployed as 
individuals.  However, as deployment commitment increases, perceptions of team 
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effectiveness are greater for individuals deploying as a group than it is for individuals 
deploying by themselves.  As previously discussed, groups deploying moderates the 
relationship between deployment commitment and team effectiveness more than 
























Figure 4.1.  Deployed Status, Commitment, and Effectiveness Relationships 
 
Recall hypothesis 5b: 
Hypothesis 5b:  The relationship between team cohesion and perceived team 
effectiveness will be moderated by whether or not troops deploy as individuals or groups 
from their respective wings. 
 
According to the hierarchical regression, the team cohesion and team 
effectiveness relationship was found to have a statistically significant beta value of 0.65.  
As expected from the literature review discussed in Chapter 2, this confirms a strong 
positive relationship exists between the two variables of team cohesion and team 
Deploy as Group 
(Y = .36DC + 5.01) 
Deploy as Individual 
(Y = .22DC + 5.01) 
Low DC High DC
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effectiveness.  Additionally, the R2 value of 0.42 explains 42 percent of the variance in 
the team cohesion and team effectiveness relationship.  This explains a considerable 
amount of the proposed model. 
The next step appears to confirm the hypothesis in that an individual’s 
deployment status does appear to moderate the relationship between deployment 
commitment and team effectiveness.  However, the value of the deployment status 
variable (0.60) was not found to be statistically significant.  Additionally, the statistically 
significant R2 value growing from 0.42 in step one to 0.43 in step two confirms that an 
individual’s deployment status explains a very small additional amount of the variance in 
the model. 
Finally, step three further confirms that individual deployment status may not 
moderate the hypothetical relationship.  The interaction variable achieved a beta value of 
-0.06.  This value was not found to be statistically significant.  This indicates that whether 
individuals deploy by themselves or with groups does not appear to moderate the 
relationship.  That is, it appears that regardless of the deployment status, team cohesion 
will still positively affect team effectiveness.  Additionally, the statistically significant R2 
value stays the same from step two to step three.  This confirms that an individual’s 
deployment status does not explain any more of the variance in the model.  See Table 4.8 







Table 4.8.  Regression for Team Cohesion and Team Effectiveness 
 
 
Team Effectiveness/Deployment Status (H5b) 
 
 1 2 3 
Step 1:    
1. Team Cohesion 
(Centered) β = 0.65***   
Step 2:    
1. Team Cohesion 
(Centered)  β = 0.65***  
2. Deployment Status 
(Centered)  β = 0.60  
Step 3:    
1. Team Cohesion 
(Centered)   β = 0.66*** 
2. Deployment Status 
(Centered)   β = 0.11 




  β = -0.06 
R2 0.42*** 0.43 0.43 
∆R2 -- 0.01 0.00 
 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed); ** p < .01 (two-tailed); * p < .05 (two-tailed) 
(N = 453) 
 
Using plotting techniques from Aiken and West (1991), the relationship among 
deployment status, team cohesion, and team effectiveness further elucidates the results.  
Figure 4.2 shows no relationship exists between team cohesion and team effectiveness 
when comparing the two with an individual’s deployment status.  That is, regardless of an 
individual’s deployment status, individuals will perceive team cohesion and team 





























Figure 4.2.  Deployed Status, Cohesion, and Effectiveness Relationships 
 
Finally, the length of time for individuals to form teams in the deployed locations 
was statistically evaluated.  Recall hypothesis 7: 
Hypothesis 7:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups, will take longer, on average, to feel as if they are part of the deployed team than 
the AEF goal of 3 to 7 days. 
 
Survey respondents who deployed as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups reported that on average it took them approximately 12.68 days (mean 2.14 on 
survey question 110; N = 178) to feel as if they were part of the deployed team.  This 
average is considerably longer than the AEF goal of three to seven days.  This finding 
supports the proposed hypothesis. 
Deploy as Group 
(Y = .66TC + 5.08) 
Deploy as Individual 
(Y = .66TC + 5.08) 
Low TC High TC 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the six basic research objectives proposed in Chapter 1 will be 
reviewed and discussed.  Additionally, the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 will be 
further discussed.  Next, Air Force implications of the research will be highlighted.  
Finally, research limitations and recommendations for future research studies will be 
evaluated. 
 
5.2  CONCLUSIONS 
5.2.1  Research Objective Discussion 
The Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) team deployment process was 
implemented in an attempt to increase predictability and stability for deploying troops.  
Additionally, it was designed to help planners allocate personnel and equipment 
resources in a more economical and efficient manner.  An ancillary benefit of the 
deployment process was its ability to increase team cohesion and team effectiveness by 
sending deploying troops as teams from the same lead wings.  Accordingly, this study 
empirically tested how well this team cohesion and team effectiveness aspects of the 
deployment process are doing. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that this research attempted to ascertain the following six 
objectives.  The objectives, and accompanying discussions, will be addressed in detail in 




5.2.1.1 Objective 1.  Determine if individuals are deploying predominantly with 
teams from the same lead wings or as individuals from different wings 
within the deployment rotation. 
 
Based on the data, it appears that most individuals are deploying with teams from 
the same lead wings rather than deploying as individuals from different wings.  The ratio 
is 1.90 deploy as a team (471) for every 1.00 who deploy as an individual (247).  This 
ratio indicates the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) team deployment process is 
deploying more teams than individuals to the various areas of responsibilities.  In other 
words, the overall goal of deploying individuals as teams from the same lead wing is 
being met.  However, it is the opinion of this researcher that this is not a very strong ratio.  
The ultimate goal should be to send all personnel from the same base; however, that 
cannot always be accomplished due to low manning in various Air Force Specialties.  
Steps have been taken by the AEF Center to implement policy that should drive more 
teaming initiatives with AEF Cycle 3 beginning 1 March 2002.  These initiatives include 
deploying larger numbers of personnel from the same base before moving to another base 
to source the requirement.  Therefore, it is expected that this ratio should increase for the 
next AEF Cycle. 
 
5.2.1.2 Objective 2.  Determine if personnel understand how the AEF deployment 
structure works. 
 
Referring to the survey results, it appears the majority of individuals understand 
how the AEF deployment structure works.  A full 89.9 percent (1109/1234) of the 
respondents perceive they understand the AEF deployment process.  This is encouraging 
as it implies that information about how the deployment process is supposed to work is 
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flowing down Air Force channels and reaching the deploying individuals.  However, 
there are still a select few who do not understand the process. 
Appendix E contains comments from survey respondents.  A review of these 
unedited comments indicates some individuals, predominantly in the junior to mid-level 
enlisted grades, are still unsure how the AEF deployment process is supposed to work.  It 
appears the events of 11 September 2001 altered the AEF deployment process.  Because 
of this incident, the AEF Center opted to rotate individuals on an “as-needed” basis to 
support OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.  Consequently, individuals who were 
not scheduled to deploy for one to two months were deployed early.  These events may 
have altered the survey respondent’s perceptions as to how the AEF deployment process 
was designed to operate.  It is the researcher’s opinion that once the AEF Center 
reinstitutes the original AEF deployment process, the individuals supporting 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM will begin to have faith in, and understand, the 
deployment process.  Because of this, it is expected that the percentage of individuals 
understanding the deployment process will increase in the future. 
 
5.2.1.3 Objective 3.  Determine if implementation of the AEF team deployment 
process has resulted in increased deployed team cohesion.  Specifically, this 
research will attempt to evaluate how the input factor of individual anxiety affects 
the team cohesion factor. 
 
Based on the data, it appears that implementation of the AEF team deployment 
process has positively affected deployed team cohesion.  The research indicates that the 
AEF deployment process has been deploying more individuals as teams from the same 
lead base.  However, as expected, individual anxiety does appear to negatively affect 
 
 74
team cohesion.  Since no previous studies have been completed in this subject, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether or not the newly implemented AEF team deployment 
concept is responsible for the increased deployed team cohesion, or if some other factor 
has affected this outcome.  It is expected that future studies could help resolve this 
dilemma by comparing those results with the results of this study.  That is, using this 
study as a baseline, future tests and results could be compared and contrasted. 
 
5.2.1.4 Objective 4.  Determine if individuals deploying from different bases (i.e., 
deploying by themselves and joining another group) perceive deployed team 
cohesion differently than individuals who deploy as a team (i.e., deploying as a 
group from one base). 
 
The data indicates that this is indeed the case.  Individuals deploying by 
themselves appear to have a different perception of team cohesion.  This could be related 
to the additional anxiety experienced by individuals deploying by themselves.  
Interestingly, there appears to be a negative relationship between deploying as individuals 
and team cohesion and deploying as groups and team cohesion.  That is, it appears that 
individuals who deploy by themselves may not be as influenced by anxiety as much as 
one would assume.  Reviewing the comments in Appendix E may provide clues to this 
trend. 
It appears that some individuals feel there may be extraneous variables involved 
when deploying with members of teams with whom they are familiar.  That is, 
personality differences and reputations may negatively affect individuals who have spent 
a majority of their time with members of the same work-group.  In general, individuals in 
the Air Force understand the requirements of missions.  That is, they understand what 
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needs to be done to achieve these goals and objectives.  Individuals who deploy by 
themselves to form a group may not have to overcome prevailing personality differences 
as readily since they are unfamiliar with each other.  This allows them to focus 
predominantly on the mission while avoiding the distractions of personality differences 
and home station distractions. 
 
5.2.1.5 Objective 5.  Determine how long it typically takes individuals to adjust 
to, and feel like a member of, a cohesive team. 
 
The research indicates that it takes approximately 12.68 days for individuals to 
begin feeling like members of a cohesive team while deployed.  This length of time may 
be too long as time is a critical issue on all deployments.  To lower this number, it is 
suggested that new AEF deployment policies be implemented allowing teammates to 
spend time together prior to their deployment.  It is expected that this familiarization 
period should help lower the average substantially.  For example, once individuals are 
identified for deployment, team training could be initiated and conducted prior to the 
departure date.  If individuals are from different lead wings, they could be flown in to 
partake in this training, thereby providing a familiarization period designed to increase 
team cohesion and alleviate potential individual anxieties. 
 
5.2.1.6 Objective 6.  Determine if team cohesion may affect perceived team 
effectiveness. 
 
The research clearly indicates a strong relationship between team cohesion and 
team effectiveness.  This finding underscores the importance of developing and nurturing 
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teams on any deployment.  As discussed in objective five, steps should to be taken to 
ensure team cohesion can be developed as rapidly as possible, preferably prior to the 
deployment.  Should this happen, the research validates that perceived team effectiveness 
on the deployment would be increased. 
 
5.2.2  Hypotheses Discussion 
In addition to ascertaining the previous research objectives, the following 
hypotheses were postulated concerning the construct of the proposed model.  The 
hypotheses are listed and discussed in the following pages. 
 
5.2.2.1 Hypothesis 1.  Based on the results it appears that the first hypothesis may 
not be supported by the data.  Recall, the following hypothesis was postulated: 
Hypothesis 1:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups experience higher individual anxiety than troops who deploy as a group with 
familiar work-groups. 
 
The results indicate that there are indeed lower levels of anxiety experienced for 
groups deploying than individuals deploying by themselves.  This indicates that 
individuals may not be as concerned when deploying in groups as they are with 
deploying by themselves.  However, these results are not statistically significant.  These 
results could be explained by the fact that military individuals may be experienced to 
deploying and moving in their careers.  Therefore, the thought of deploying by 
themselves does not influence them as much as it may influence someone else who is not 
used to deploying or moving in his or her career.  Additionally, Air Force personnel 
within specific Air Force Specialties are essentially trained the same at their respective 
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bases.  The training individuals receive may lead to less anxiety as individuals can fall 
back on their training experience to make them feel part of the deployed team. 
 
5.2.2.2 Hypothesis 2.  The data appears to support hypothesis 2, which read: 
Hypothesis 2:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower group unity than troops who deploy as a group with familiar 
work-groups. 
 
According to the analysis of variance (ANOVA), individuals deploying by 
themselves do indeed perceive less group unity than troops who deploy as a group from 
the same lead wing.  This reinforces the belief that individuals should deploy 
predominantly from the same lead wing.  This finding reinforces what Yukl (1998) stated 
concerning group unity and how individuals from the same group may obtain 
psychological support from each other. 
 
 5.2.2.3 Hypothesis 3.  Another research aspect examined how the work-group 
characteristics, comprised of group spirit (potency), social support, and communication 
and cooperation, were perceived by individuals deploying by themselves and individuals 
deploying as a group.  Recall Campion et al. (1993) found that potency, social support, 
and communication and cooperation are important characteristics of work-groups that 
positively influence the team cohesion and team effectiveness constructs.  To that end, 
the following hypothesis were postulated: 
Hypothesis 3:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower work-group characteristics than troops who deploy as a 




 Based on the data results, the hypothesis was strongly supported in the 
deployment environment.  That is, people who deployed as a group displayed higher 
work-group characteristics than people who deployed as individuals.  This appears to 
make sense as individuals deploying as a group have had more time prior to their 
deployment to develop the needed work-group characteristics of group spirit, social 
support, and communication and cooperation within the group to positively influence the 
team cohesion factor.  Commanders, tasked to complete objectives in a timely manner at 
deployed locations, can take advantage of this finding by creating work-groups in the 
deployed location composed primarily of individuals who have deployed together as a 
team.  These individuals should be able to accomplish any task in a timely and efficient 
manner, provided all required resources are available. 
 
 5.2.2.4 Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  Part of the proposed thesis model in Chapter 2 was 
designed to explore how deployment commitment effects perceived team effectiveness.  
Recall the following postulated hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower deployment commitment than troops who deploy as a group 
with familiar work-groups. 
 
 Based on the data, it appears this is not the case.  Surprisingly, the study found 
that troops deploying as individuals have higher deployment commitment than troops 
deploying as groups.  This could be attributed to the same training individuals received 
from their bases.  Additionally, some survey comments reflect that some individuals 
enjoy deploying by themselves as it provides them a break from their home station work-
group.  This break may lead to higher deployment commitment.  Additionally, the results 
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were not found to be statistically significant since the means were fairly close, 5.41 for 
individuals deploying by themselves and 5.37 for individuals deploying as groups.  This 
could indicate that deployment commitment is relatively high for all deploying personnel 
regardless of their deployment status.  However, the next hypothesis seems to shed even 
more light on the issue. 
The next aspect of the model was designed to explore how troops deploying as 
groups or as individuals influence the deployment commitment and team effectiveness 
relationship.  To that end, the following hypothesis was postulated: 
Hypothesis 4b:  The relationship between deployment commitment and perceived 
team effectiveness will be moderated by whether or not troops deploy as individuals or 
groups from their respective wings. 
 
According to the analysis there is a relationship between deployment commitment 
and perceived team effectiveness as Van Dyne et al. (1994) found.  This relationship was 
found to contain a statistically significant beta value of 0.36.  Additionally, the 
relationship appears to be dependent upon whether one deploys as a group or as an 
individual.  Recall this interaction variable achieved a statistically significant beta value 
of 0.48.  This indicates that whether individuals deploy by themselves or with groups 
does moderate the relationship.  Further evaluation showed there was a stronger 
relationship between deployment commitment and team effectiveness for individuals 
deploying as a group than for individuals deploying by themselves.  This could be 
explained by the fact that individuals deploying as a group perceive a stronger 
commitment to the deployment because they understand their specific unit’s mission.  
Survey comments located in Appendix E seem to verify this statement.  Multiple 
individuals appeared to express their feelings for working with and understanding their 
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specific unit’s role in a deployed environment.  This organizational pride may lead to the 
higher moderation between deployment commitment and team effectiveness. 
 
5.2.2.5 Hypotheses 5a and 5b.  The next aspect of the model explored how troops 
perceived team cohesion on their deployments.  To that end, the following hypothesis 
was postulated: 
Hypothesis 5a:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups will perceive lower team cohesion than troops who deploy as a group with 
familiar work-groups. 
 
This hypothesis was not validated but highlights a concern for deploying 
individuals.  The statistical significance between the two means of the groups, deploy as 
individuals (4.33) and deploy as groups (4.51), was not found to be significant.  
However, the means by themselves do validate the hypothesis.  Clearly, individuals that 
do not feel team cohesion will also not feel team effectiveness.  This could detrimentally 
contribute to a deployed mission.  To mitigate this, commanders should take steps to 
ensure team cohesion exists as soon as possible at the deployed location.  The results of 
this effort should lead to higher team effectiveness. 
The next hypothesis explored the concept of team cohesion and its relation to 
perceived team effectiveness in terms of individual or group deployment influence.  
Recall the following hypothesis was postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 5b:  The relationship between team cohesion and perceived team 
effectiveness will be moderated by whether or not troops deploy as individuals or groups 




 As expected, the data concludes that team cohesion is strongly related to 
perceived team effectiveness.  The high and statistically significant beta value of 0.65 
displays strong correlations that indicate team cohesion is positively related to perceived 
team effectiveness.  These results confirm the theory explained by Carless and De Paola 
(2000).  That is, troops who experience high team cohesion do perceive high team 
effectiveness.  Interestingly, this relationship was only slightly more influenced by 
deploying as an individual (β = 0.66) versus deploying as a group (β = 0.62).  This 
statistically significant finding appears to indicate that individuals deploying by 
themselves moderates the relationship more than group deploying.  This makes it vitally 
important to mission success to ensure all personnel perceive a sense of team cohesion, or 
organizational direction or pride, prior to their deployment. 
 
5.2.2.6 Hypothesis 6.  The next hypothesis explored how individuals perceived 
team effectiveness on their respective deployments.  The following hypothesis was 
postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Individuals who deployed from the same AEF lead wing 
(homogeneous work-group) will exhibit higher perceived team effectiveness than 
individuals who deployed from different wings (heterogeneous work-group) on their 
respective AEF rotation. 
 
This hypothesis was confirmed both with the direction of the means (5.17 for 
troops deploying as a group and 4.90 for troops deploying individual) and the statistical 
significance (p < .05).  This further supports the premise that deploying as groups should 
help increase team effectiveness in a deployed location.  As previously mentioned, 
commanders should take all necessary steps to ensure troops deploy from the same AEF 
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lead wings and, if they have to deploy individuals, ensure those individuals are allowed to 
train with and become familiar with their respective teammates prior to their AEF 
deployment. 
 
5.2.2.7 Hypothesis 7.  Finally, another hypothesis of the study was to examine 
how long, if at all, it typically takes individuals deploying by themselves to adjust to, and 
work into, the established team cohesion.  Recall Nowak (1999) stated that ideally, 
deployed troops would be working to full capability within three to seven days of arrival 
in the deployed location.  Intuitively, it appears that the sooner an individual can feel part 
of the team, the sooner they should be able to contribute to the perceived group 
effectiveness.  To that end, the following null hypothesis was postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 7:  Troops who deploy as individuals to work in unfamiliar work-
groups, will take longer, on average, to feel as if they are part of the deployed team than 
the AEF goal of 3 to 7 days. 
 
To test this hypothesis, it was quantitatively determined that individuals who 
deploy by themselves took on average 12.68 days to feel part of the cohesive team.  
Based on the results, it appears that the proposed hypothesis should be accepted.  This 
data appears to indicate that deploying as an individual may be detrimental to team 
cohesion and team effectiveness.  The first few days of any deployment are vitally critical 
to that mission’s success.  Individuals who may not be familiar with other deployed 
work-group members may experience increased anxiety that could deter them from 
successfully accomplishing the mission.  All efforts should be made to allow individuals 
deploying by themselves to train with, or spend time with, the other deploying 
individuals who they will work with on a regular basis at the deployed location.  If this 
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cannot be accomplished, commanders should realize the potentially detrimental effects 
on their mission. 
 
5.3  AIR FORCE IMPLICATIONS 
 The findings in this study begin to highlight a number of key issues that Air Force 
leaders should consider when developing AEF deployment policy and managing human 
resources.  For example, the research verifies that deploying as many individuals from 
the same base increases team cohesion and team effectiveness.  It is imperative to 
implement and adhere to this pre-designed deployment policy.  Not only does this policy 
contribute to the overall mission effectiveness, it provides predictability for deploying 
individuals and the bases from which these resources are being drawn.  New policy being 
initiated in AEF Cycle 3 should help to further ensure that more teams from the same 
lead wings will be deployed than individuals from a variety of other wings within their 
respective AEF rotations.  Additionally, the policy must continue to be communicated to 
Air Force personnel lest they lose faith with the deploying individuals. 
 Additional Air Force implications exist through a better understanding of the 
deploying individuals.  For example, commanders can use the information in this study to 
provide an environment with stronger relationships for their deploying individuals.  It is 
recommended that commanders of AEF tasked units set time aside to allow team training 
and team building activities to commence.  These steps could go a long way towards 
alleviating any pre-deployment anxieties individuals may have.  Additionally, increased 
team cohesion could be realized prior to deployments that might save time when the 
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individuals actually deploy.  That is, time could be saved in the deployed location by 
achieving team cohesion and team effectiveness quicker. 
It is anticipated this study will provide a baseline for senior Expeditionary 
Aerospace Force (EAF) strategists to use when making key EAF team integrity decisions 
in the future.  For example, these results may help with Unit Type Codes (UTCs) right-
sizing initiatives by helping to establish the correct size of work-group built UTCs.  
Despite Civil Engineering's initiative to right size their UTCs, the AEF Center is still 
attempting to establish the right size of UTCs in other career fields and plans to 
implement policy within the next year to help guide units in the field. 
Although Cohen and Bailey (1997) found that good quality organizational 
research based in field settings is now starting to accumulate, comparisons across settings 
and types of teams are difficult and many important areas related to team effectiveness 
remain understudied.  This field research may help further team cohesiveness and 
effectiveness, from a military and academic perspective, by expanding current levels of 
team cohesion knowledge and literature. 
It is hoped that this study, in conjunction with other AEF studies performed at 
AFIT concerning work-family conflict, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment, 
may spawn a joint AFIT and public or private university study.  Offerman and Spiros 
(2001) found in their study that several academics requested to be paired with full-time 
practitioners.  In their findings, the academics offered to do the required team research in 
an effort to reinforce or disprove current team cohesion theories.  It is expected that this 
teaming of military and academic research would further elucidate the issue, while 
 
 85
providing additional information for senior Air Force policy makers to base their 
decisions about future AEF team deployment processes. 
 
5.4  LIMITATIONS 
Ideally, a comprehensive experiment should have no research limitations and 
therefore have high internal and external validity.  However, in real-world applications, 
this is seldom the case.  The following discussion addresses some identified potential 
research method limitations and provides possible mitigation methods to increase future 
internal and external validity. 
First, typical projected and previously deployed AEF Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 
rotations 1/2, 5/6, 7/8, and 9/10 airmen change stations approximately every two to four 
years.  Because of this rotation, it may be difficult to provide an accurate enumeration of 
these projected and previously deployed AEF Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 rotations airmen.  
Second, attrition may adversely affect the population.  Previously deployed AEF Cycle 2 
and AEF Cycle 3 airmen may have separated or retired from active duty, which may limit 
the survey response.  However, little can be done to mitigate attrition from the 
researcher’s perspective.  That is, attrition is exogenous to the researcher’s control. 
Third, individuals may not choose to partake in the web-based survey for a variety 
of reasons.  Low completion rates may stem from low contact rates, low cooperation 
rates, or both (Dooley, 2001).  It is anticipated that AEF Center support helped guard 
against this potential limitation by stressing to projected and previously deployed AEF 
Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 airmen the importance of this research to future Air Force 
deployments.  Fourth, since this is a web-based survey, the respondents may not have 
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yielded as honest an answer as they would during a face-to-face interview or a telephone 
interview.  Personal contact maximizes trust and cooperation between interviewer and 
interviewee (Dooley, 2001).  However, since it is impractical to conduct either face-to-
face or telephone interviews, interviewee responses will be taken as objective input by 
the researcher. 
Fifth, another point of concern with the web-based survey may be the fact that the 
responses appeared to be slightly skewed toward the enlisted population.  For example, 
the responses only captured the perceptions of approximately 13 percent of officers in the 
Air Force population.  Additionally, within the enlisted structure, it appears that only 11.2 
percent of the airmen in the grade of E-3 and below responded to the survey.  This skews 
the responses in the direction of the middle enlisted ranks.  This could be attributed to the 
fact that some airmen in the grade of E-3 and below may not have access to computer 
accounts.  Additionally, the survey responses appeared to be skewed to married personnel 
as opposed to single personnel. 
Sixth, errors and biases should be minimized.  To minimize these anticipated 
confounding issues, guidance from thesis advisors and committee members was fully 
utilized.  Questionnaire construction was evaluated and reviewed for issues such as 
compound items, closed-ended questions, questionnaire length, and order effects.  
Despite these intensive review sessions, errors can and do occur.  For example, multiple 
questions on the survey asked whether or not the individuals deployed as a group or as an 
individual.  The value of asking the same questions more than one way is to increase 
internal validity of the questionnaire.  However, the researcher feels that all but one or 
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two of these questions could have been eliminated to determine the answer to the 
question. 
Seventh, correlational design methods can provide only weak support for causal 
linkages (Dooley, 2001).  To check for possible confounding variables, it is anticipated 
the statistical measures that will be used in the methodology will control these possible 
confounding variables.  Eighth, the survey may have been too long.  This may have had 
detrimental affects on the answers to many of the questions.  Individuals tend to lose 
focus and concentration on lengthy surveys and this may have occurred with this 119-
item survey.  The researcher feels that shortening the survey may increase reliability and 
validity.  Ninth, based on a review of the survey comments, the survey may have been 
confusing in places.  For example, some sections of the survey were only applicable to 
individuals who had actually deployed.  However, poor wording of the instructions did 
not make this fact clear to the subject.  Additionally, the survey should have provided 
“not applicable” choices in some sections to allow individuals the ability to further 
delineate their answers. 
Finally, method variance may have occurred since the survey was the only 
method for collecting data.  It would be very beneficial, for future studies, to develop a 
methodology to measure individual perceptions in more than just one method.  For 
example, surveys could be sent out initially and then followed by telephone calls asking 
the same information in a different manner.  This would reinforce the data and lend 




5.5  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The sample size may have misled the researcher to findings that may not have 
significant differences in real-world application.  Although the sample size was relatively 
high by some standards, it is still not the entire AEF population.  A recommendation 
would be to perform the analysis with a full compliment of surveys from all personnel 
assigned to the AEF.  The research results from this full compliment of AEF personnel 
would increase the validity of the research by measuring the perceptions of all assigned 
AEF personnel. 
Another recommendation may be to increase the number of survey responses 
received.  The researcher initially felt the cost of mailing the surveys would be 
prohibitive and unreasonable due to the convenience of e-mail technology.  Another 
reason a combination mail and web-based survey was not chosen is because it was 
expected the majority of both current and past AEF Cycle 2 and 3 deployed personnel 
would have active web-based e-mail accounts.  Because of this, it was deemed not 
necessary to mail the survey via official Air Force mail avenues.  However, it is 
recommended that future studies use a combination of both web-based and mail-based 
surveys to ensure surveys can be sent to airmen who may not have access to e-mail 
accounts on their bases. 
Another recommendation would be to expand upon this work and evaluate how 
this research may tie with predictability and work-family conflict.  It is thought that job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment, considered as outcome variables, will be 
directly related to the perceived team effectiveness variable.  Job satisfaction can be 
considered an “attitudinal variable” (Richter, 2001) and can be defined as a “global 
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feeling about the job or as a related constellation of attitudes about various aspects of the 
job” (Spector, 1997).  As an individual’s perceived team effectiveness increases, it is 
anticipated that his or her level of job satisfaction will increase too.  Organizational 
commitment, another key factor in the model that must be understood, is the degree to 
which an employee identifies with the organization and is willing to put forth effort on its 
behalf (Mowday et al., 1979).  Although not the topic of this thesis, job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment were used in the survey as a potential bridge to the 
Predictability and Work-Family Conflict study conducted by Underhill (2002) and 
Obruba (2001).  Based on that analysis, studies could be created to determine if 
individuals who perceived high job satisfaction also perceived high team effectiveness.  
Additionally, the study could attempt to determine if individuals who perceived high 
organizational commitment also perceived high team effectiveness. 
Another recommendation is that despite the fact SPSS 10.1 modeling is useful for 
explaining tests and interactions, it does not accurately determine the effect size of those 
interactions between the variables.  Because of this, it may be useful to perform analysis 
on the data using other types of statistical tools in an effort to further support the findings 
in this study.  Additional statistical tools employed in future studies should focus on 
multi-group Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).  SEM evaluates the relationship of 
hypothetical variables with concrete measured variables from the survey data.  The 
statistical software package LISERAL 8.0 is ideal when analyzing multiple-indicator 
models and should be used to analyze future survey data.  The SEM statistical analysis 
technique is similar to multiple regressions; in fact, traditional multiple regression 
analysis is actually a special case of the SEM approach (Jaccard & Wan, 1996).  
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However, an advantage of SEM over multiple regression techniques is its ability to report 
measurement error and improve overall fit testing of proposed constructs. 
Finally, the cross-sectional nature of this pilot study does not allow inference of 
causality.  Perhaps a retrospective cohort study, or longitudinal design, may better 
support the tested hypotheses.  Offermann et al. (2001:386) found that respondents 
indicated interest in greater use of longitudinal designs allowing teams to be examined at 
different points of maturity. 
 
5.6  FINAL COMMENTS 
In general, the study verified that deployed, and deploying, individuals feel that 
the AEF team deployment process does positively affect team cohesion and team 
effectiveness.  What these findings suggest is that with the exception of OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM, Air Force individuals feel that the AEF team deployment 
process is generally working as it has been advertised. 
Interestingly, it was determined that it may not make too much of a difference as 
to whether individuals deploy by themselves from different AEF lead wings or if they 
deploy as a group from the same AEF lead wing.  It is believed that this finding indicates 
that it may be sufficient to deploy individuals by themselves, but that commanders should 
take all measures necessary to avoid doing that when it is in their power.  Additionally, if 
commanders would allow more time prior to the scheduled AEF deployment for team 




Appendix A.  Unit Type Codes/Line Remarks 
Unit Type Codes (UTCs) are specifically built teams with specific capabilities.  
These specially built teams are not unique to the military only.  For example, much of the 
work performed by crews, groups, or teams in the military as well as the private sector 
(e.g., nuclear power plants, commercial airlines, power utility crews). 
Lessons Learned reports from Kosovo operations indicate that UTCs designed to 
support Major Theater War (MTW) planning may be too large.  Past efforts to shape 
force size to meet MTW requirements and minimize the number of UTCs in the Air 
Force drove the creation of large UTC packages that are inadequate to meet today’s 
small-scale requirements (JULLS, 1999).  The Air Force is structured to deploy to a 
MTW but is engaged on a regular schedule for small-scale contingencies. 
Current UTC sizes are not small enough to provide the flexibility required to 
successfully source these smaller scale mission requirements.  AEF officials noticed in 
(AEF) Cycle 2 that the current UTCs were designed to meet the nation’s strategy of being 
able to fight two major theater wars at the same time.  Colonel Walter Burns, then 
commander of the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center and now Air Combat 
Command Civil Engineer, states in a U.S. Department of Air Force report (Agency 
Group 09, 2001): 
They were all very large UTCs and were in contrast to the much 
smaller needs of ongoing requirements like operations Southern Watch 
and Northern Watch.  Before, you would have seven or eight different 
bases providing one or two or three people to go over to do the work in 
a particular shop.  The team developed after they got off the plane and 
reported for duty.  There was no coherent team aspect there.  So UTCs 
are being redesigned to reflect the demands of the current world 
environment.  With smaller, scalable UTCs, many of the teams 
deploying for AEF Cycle 3 will come from a single base, rather than 





Getting the UTCs sized correctly and expanding the AEF library are top priorities 
(Agency Group 09, 2001).  Right sizing UTCs could lead to increased team cohesion and, 
subsequently lead to higher team effectiveness. 
The UTC restructuring endeavor is designed to focus on creating modular, 
scalable UTCs that allow force providers to respond to the full spectrum of military 
operations.  This full spectrum of military operations should meet small-scale 
requirements and still be able to be brought together to meet MTW requirements.  The 
UTC teaming concept also means most expeditionary combat support troops will travel at 
the same time as the aircrews and maintainers in their unit, a major step toward achieving 
team integrity. 
As Figure A.1 depicts, Civil Engineer (CE) deployment teams are being 
restructured to meet the newly proposed modular, scalable UTCs.  For example, 
historical CE deployment teams deployed as one large, 132-person UTC.  This concept 
did not allow planners the ability to meet small-scale requirements.  However, the new 
UTC structure does.  These smaller “building block” UTCs provide a more flexible, 
























Source:  Aerospace Expeditionary Force – Introductory Brief (2001) 
Figure A.1.  Modular Scaleable UTCs – CE Lead Team UTC Restructure 
 
Logistical planners, using Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) 
bases, can quickly load UTCs during real world conflicts, deployments, or exercises.  The 
TPFDD is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an 
operation plan (AFI 10-400, 1999).  The TPFDD contains time-phased force data, non-
unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operational plan.  It also 
includes information on in-place units, units to be deployed to support the operation plan 
with apriority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation, 
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10-400, 1999).  Planners in the AEF Center at Langley AFB use the TPFDD database to 
select the forces needed to support ongoing and contingency operations (AFAA, 2001). 
In general, line remarks drive the quality of the manpower resource pool available 
to AOR commanders.  In the initial tasking process, AOR commanders send out line 
remarks to ensure the highest quality individual is assigned to fulfill the critical AOR 
mission.  These line remarks are used as tools to dictate how qualified individuals should 
be to fulfill the AOR mission.  By and large, it is believed that higher qualified 
individuals may indicate higher quality individuals. 
Specific research on how line remarks may affect stateside ability to fulfill 
minimum manning requirements in the various AORs around the globe is key.  Line 
remarks are used to delineate specific requirements for individual manpower 
requirements.  For example, the AOR commander may ask for an individual to fulfill a 
tasking who has at least two years experience as a maintenance engineer and has a 
minimum grade of O-3.  Although these requirements ensure the AOR is manned 
appropriately to fulfill its mission, the line remarks may be too strict for the lead wing to 
fulfill.  In that case, they must go outside the base resource pool to acquire this resource.  
This could cause a loss in achieving two of the main goals of the AEF concept, which are 
to maintain team integrity and provide predictability to individuals.  Additionally, it could 
cause a delay in the delivery of that resource which would produce a lag-time in the 




Appendix B.  Understanding the AEF Cycle  
Lead AEF wings, being in a “deployment/on-call” phase, characterize the first 
phase.  These wings are either deployed to the various AORs or are in an “on-call” status 
of being ready to deploy within 24 to 96 hours.  Ideally, the units will be in-place within 
72 hours of notification.  Thus the time that a unit, and that unit’s personnel spend within 
the three-month “on-call” phase is typically referred to as a “vulnerability window,” 
because the personnel may not actually have to deploy (Obruba, 2001).  During this 
phase, the lead wing’s home station will not be tasked to partake in any exercises as it is 
anticipated the remaining manpower resource pool will be taxed sufficiently carrying out 
normal day-to-day base operations. 
Upon completion of the “deployment/on-call” phase, the lead AEF wings partake 
in a “recovery” phase.  This second phase lasts approximately two weeks and provides 
the previously deployed troops time to recover from their deployment through rest and 
relaxation.  Additionally, it is during this time that the returned troops are expected to 
work out personal administrative issues that stem from being away from home for 
extended periods of time. 
The third phase of the 15-month AEF deployment cycle is called the “normal 
training and exercise” phase.  During this 9.5-month phase base personnel will work 
normal day-to-day operations and will be vulnerable for base Phase I and II Operational 
Readiness Exercises (OREs).  This phase concentrates on unit missions and basic 
proficiency events, in accordance with applicable Air Force Directives and Air Force 
Specialty Code requirements, and may include Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Air Force or 
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MAJCOM exercise participation (AFI 10-400, 1999).  Additionally, this phase allows 
personnel the opportunity to effectively manage their annual leave accounts, attend 
school if desired, and spend time with family and friends. 
The fourth and final phase is the “preparation/spin-up” phase.  This two-month 
phase prepares the deploying troops by identifying specific AOR manpower 
requirements.  The two-month deployment preparation period focuses unit activities on 
AOR specific events required for the 90-day “on-call/deployment” vulnerability period 
that follows (AFI 10-400, 1999).  Once these specific AOR manpower requirements are 
identified, personnel are tasked individually.  They receive all specialized required 
training and also receive special equipment and clothing.  Finally, Air Force Inspector 
General teams are scheduled to evaluate wings with Phase I and II Operational Readiness 
Inspections (ORIs) during this time period.  Ideally, these ORIs are coordinated to 
coincide with the actual deployments of the lead AEF Wing’s departing troops and 
airframes. 
As shown in Figure B.1, at any one point in time there are two overlapping AEFs.  
This overlap is designed to provide a sufficient projected overseas force to carry out 
critical missions if required.  Additionally, there are enough personnel remaining at 
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About the Study  
Survey Control Number:  01-107 
Expiration Date:  31 Mar 02 
 
Purpose:  This research will investigate the effects of deployment predictability, family 
support and work-family conflict on job satisfaction, non-work satisfaction, team 
cohesion, and overall intent to stay in the Air Force. 
 
Confidentiality:  We would greatly appreciate your completing the survey.  Your 
answers are important.  Your perceptions and actual experiences are essential.  ALL 
ANSWERS ARE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and, unless you wish to tell us your 
identity, all answers are anonymous.  No one outside the research team will ever see your 
questionnaire.  No identification of individual responses will occur.  We ask for some 
demographic information in order to interpret results more accurately and make 
comparisons between large groups. 
 
Disposition: We will provide a report to the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center.  We 
can also make the results available to you if requested.  
 
Time Required: It will probably take you about 20 – 30 minutes to complete this 
questionnaire. 
 
Suspense:  Please complete and return survey NLT Friday, 21 Dec 2001.   
 
Contact Information: If you have any questions or comments regarding this survey, you 
may contact either one of us or our thesis advisors via email, mail, or phone.  Thank you 




     //Signed//          //Signed// 
Capt John Underhill    Capt Michael J. Zuhlsdorf 
Air Force Institute of Technology/ENV Air Force Institute of Technology/ENV 
2950 P Street, Bldg. 640   2950 P Street, Bldg. 640 
WPAFB OH  45433-7765   WPAFB OH  45433-7765 
john.underhill@afit.edu   michael.zuhlsdorf@afit.edu  
DSN 785-3636 ext. 6046   DSN 785-3636 ext. 6052 
 
     //Signed//          //Signed// 
Major Michael Rehg, Ph.D.   Lt Col Alfred E. Thal, Ph.D. 
Air Force Institute of Technology/ENV Air Force Institute of Technology/ENV 
2950 P Street, Bldg. 640   2950 P Street, Bldg. 640 
WPAFB OH  45433-7765   WPAFB OH  45433-7765 
michael.rehg@afit.edu   alfred.thal@afit.edu  





In accordance with AFI 37-132, Paragraph 3.2, the following information is provided as 
required by the Privacy Act of 1974: 
Authority: 10 U.S.C. 8012, Secretary of the Air Force; powers and duties; delegation by; 
implemented by AFI 36-2601, Air Force Personnel Survey Program. 
Purpose: To obtain information regarding the attitudes, feelings, and perceptions of Air 
Force Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve personnel. 
Routine Use: No analysis of individual responses will be conducted and only members 
of the research team will be permitted access to the raw data.   
No individual will be identified to anyone outside of the research team.   
Participation:  Participation is VOLUNTARY.  No adverse action will be taken against 








All items are answered by filling in the appropriate spaces directly on the survey or 
writing a response in the space provided.  If, for any item, you do not find a response that 
fits your situation exactly, use the one that is the closest to the way you feel. 
 
Please complete the questionnaire, seal it and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope 
through your base mail system to: 
 

















Questions in this part are designed to assess your deployment status.  Mark the circle that 
corresponds to the selection that best describes the way you feel about each issue. 
 
In the following statements, the word "Deployment" refers to an official duty away 
from home where you are temporarily assigned to another unit.  The term “TDY” 
refers to an official duty away from home where there is not a change of  unit 
assignment.  The term “scheduled deployment” refers to a deployment that you 
were made aware of at least 60 days prior to deployment.  The term “AEF” refers to 
the Aerospace Expeditionary Force framework for deployments.  The term “AEF 
concept” refers to the entire AEF deployment process to include the lead-wing 
rotations, rotation assignment, vulnerability window, training, notification of 
deployment, departure, arrival, return, and recuperation period after the 
deployment.  Please answer each statement with respect to these definitions. 
 
1.  Which statement best describes your knowledge of the AEF concept? 
O  I understand the AEF concept 
O  I do not understand the AEF concept  
 
2.  Which statement best describes your AEF status? 
O  I am assigned to AEF rotation 1-2 
O  I am assigned to AEF rotation 3-4 
O  I am assigned to AEF rotation 5-6 
O  I am assigned to AEF rotation 7-8 
O  I am assigned to AEF rotation 9-10 
O  I do not know when I am assigned to an AEF 
O  I am not assigned to an AEF 
  
3.  Describe your current Deployment status. 
O  I have returned from a deployment within the last 12 months 
O  I am scheduled to deploy within the next 3 months 
O  None of the above  
 
4.  If you have deployed or will deploy (within the last/next 3 months), how much notice 
were you given? 
O  More than 90 days notice prior to deploying 
O  60 to 90 days notice prior to deploying 
O  30 to 59 days notice prior to deploying 
O  Less than 30 days notice prior to deploying 
 
5.  Were you on a TDY over the last year? (Not including deployments as described 
above) 
O  Yes 
O  No 
 
If Yes, how many total times were you TDY over the last year? 
If Yes, how many total days were you TDY over the last year? 
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For each statement, please circle the number that indicates the extent to which you 
agree the statement is true.  Use the scale below for your responses.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Neither Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree Disagree nor 
Agree 
Agree  Agree 
6.  I feel certain my AEF schedule will not change over the next 15 months. 
7.  Deployment predictability is important to me. 
8.  Since the Air Force implemented the AEF, I can better plan events in my life. 
9.  I know when I am vulnerable for deployment under the AEF rotation system. 
10.  I understand how the AEF rotation system works. 
11.  I think the AEF rotation system is fair. 
12.  All in all, I like the AEF rotation system. 
13.  I am actively looking for a job outside the Air Force. 
14.  I’m seriously thinking about separating from the Air Force at my first opportunity. 
15.  I often think about quitting my job with the Air Force. 
16.  I think I will still be working for the Air Force 5 years from now. 
17.  I will leave the Air Force as soon as I am able to separate. 
18.  All in all, I am satisfied with my job. 
19.  In general, I do not like my job. 
20.  In general, I like working for the Air Force. 
21.  I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with the Air Force. 
22.  I really feel as if the Air Force’s problems are my own. 
23.  I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to the Air Force. 
24.  I do not feel emotionally attached to the Air Force. 
25.  I do not feel like a part of the Air Force family.  
26.  The Air Force has a great deal of personal meaning to me. 
27.  Air Force deployments keep me away from my family more than I would like. 
28.  Deploying as part of my Air Force career is compatible with my personal life. 
29.  I often feel the strain of trying to balance my Air Force responsibilities and family. 
30.  The possibility of Air Force deployments causes me to be irritable with my family. 
31.  The possibility of Air Force deployments does not interfere with my personal life. 
32.  The tension of balancing Air Force deployments and personal responsibilities 
causes me to feel emotionally drained. 
33.  My supervisor/peers dislike how preoccupied I am with my personal life. 
34.  My family responsibilities make me not want to deploy. 
35.  My family depends on me too much for me to deploy for the Air Force. 
36.  My family dislikes the possibility of me deploying for the Air Force. 
37.  My family understands my responsibilities to the Air Force. 
38.  My family accepts the possibility of me deploying for the Air Force. 
39.  My personal life takes up time that I’d like to spend at work. 
40.  My personal demands are so great that it takes away from my Air Force work. 
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In this section, please indicate the degree to which you receive the following in your 
personal life: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All Very Small Small Some Moderate Large Very Large 
 Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree 
41.  Feedback from others? 
42.  Appreciation? 
43.  Opportunity to “take time off” when needed? 
44.  Sharing of duties? 
45.  Sharing of responsibilities? 
46.  Emotional support? 
 
Please indicate the quality of the relationship you have with the following person or groups 
of persons: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely Very Low Moderate High Very Extremely 
Low Low    High High 
47.  Spouse 
48.  Family 
49.  Friends 
 
The following section is designed to assess your perception of what you think of the Air 
Force’s AEF Team Deployment Concept 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Neither Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree Disagree nor Agree Agree  Agree 
50.  I think the current AEF Team Deployment concept is effective.   
51.  I think the AEF Team Deployment concept is better than deploying individually.   
52.  All in all, I like the AEF Team Deployment concept.   















The following section is designed to assess your perception of your deployed work-group.  
When answering the following questions, please consider the following AEF “Work-
Group” definition – people, from your home station, you work with on a daily basis to 
accomplish your work mission or objectives. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Neither Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree Disagree nor Agree Agree  Agree 
54.  Given the choice, I would prefer to deploy with members of my home station 
work-group rather than deploy as an individual.  
55.  I find working as a member of an AEF work-group increases my ability to perform 
effectively.   
56.  I generally prefer to work as part of a work-group.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Neither Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree Disagree nor Agree Agree  Agree 
57.  I have confidence that my deployed work-group can perform effectively.  
58.  My deployed work-group can take on nearly any task and complete it.  
59.  My deployed work-group has a lot of team spirit.  
60.  Being on my AEF work-group gives me the opportunity provide support to other 
AEF team members. 
61.  My work-group increases my opportunities for positive social interaction. 
62.  When needed, members of my AEF work-group help each other out. 
63.  Members of my AEF work-group are willing to share information with other team 
members about our work. 
64.  AEF work-groups enhance communication among people working on the same 
deployment. 
65.  Members of my AEF work-group cooperate to get the mission accomplished. 
 
In this section, indicate your level of concern with the deployment (Please use the same 
scale from the previous section): 
 
66.  The thought of this deployment worries/worried me. 
67.  I feel anxious about working with members of other teams.  













Please indicate the quality of the relationship you have with the following person or 
groups of persons: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree Agree 
Very Much  Slightly Disagree nor Agree Slightly  Very 
Much 
69.  If given the choice, I would prefer to work with WORKING-GROUP 
PERSONNEL  (i.e. – someone who I am very familiar with)  
70.  If given the choice, I would prefer to work with SQUADRON PERSONNEL.  (i.e. 
– someone who I am somewhat familiar with) 
71.  If given the choice, I would prefer to work with BASE PERSONNEL.  (i.e. – 
someone who I am not very familiar with) 
72.  I like the people in my work-group. 
73.  I was familiar with my co-workers on the deployment. 
74.  I find I have to work harder at my job because of the incompetence of the people in 
my work-group. 
75.  There was too much bickering and fighting within my work-group on the 
deployment.  
76.  My work-group supervisor, on my AEF deployment, was quite competent in doing 
his or her job.  
77.  My work-group supervisor, on my AEF deployment, was unfair to me.   
78.  My work-group supervisor showed too little interest in the feelings of his or her 
subordinates within the work-group. 
79.  I liked my work-group supervisor on my AEF deployment. 
 
When answering the following questions, the term “deployed team” refers to the AEF 
rotation you are assigned.  For example, if you are assigned to AEF 5/6, then your 
“deployed team” is the group of people on AEF 5/6.  If you are assigned to AEF 9/10, then 
your “deployed team” is the group of people on AEF 9/10. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Neither Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree Disagree nor Agree Agree  Agree 
80.  Our deployed team is united in trying to succeed.  
81.  I’m happy with my deployed team’s level of commitment to the mission. 
82.  Our deployed team members have conflicting aspirations for the team’s performance. 
83.  The deployed team concept provides me opportunities to improve my personal 
performance.  
84.  Our deployed team would like to spend time together outside of work hours. 
85.  Members of our deployed team stick together outside of work time.  
86.  Our deployed team members rarely socialize together.  
87.  Our deployed team would rather go out on their own than get together as a team.  
88.  This deployed team is one of the most important social groups to which I belong.  
89.  Some of my best friends are on this deployed team.  
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90.  I am going to miss the members of my deployed team when this deployment ends.  
91.  If members of our deployed team have problems or concerns, everyone wants to help 
them so we can get back together again. 
92.  I try to avoid deployments when possible. 
93.  I have problems working with others on deployments. 
94.  I avoid extra duties and responsibilities within the deployment. 
95.  Compared to other work-groups I have been associated with, the effectiveness of my 
work-group in this AEF Team Deployment is excellent. 
96.  My work-group was very effective on the deployment. 
97.  All in all, this work-group was very competent. 
98.  In my estimation, our work-group gets the work done effectively. 
99.  My work-groups overall level of effectiveness was very high. 
 
100.  In general, how satisfying do you find the ways you’re spending your life these 
days?  Would you call it completely satisfying, pretty satisfying, or not very satisfying? 
(Please fill in ONE circle) 
O  Completely satisfying 
O  Pretty satisfying 
O  Not very satisfying 
 
101.  Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days?  Would you 
say you’re very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?  (please fill in ONE 
circle) 
O  Very happy 
O  Pretty happy 
O  Not too happy 
 
The following section is designed to assess your perception of how well the Air Force 
has done implementing the AEF Team Deployment process.  The term “AEF Team” 
refers to the AEF rotation you are assigned.  For example if you are assigned to 
AEF 5/6, then your “AEF Team” is the group of people on AEF 5/6. 
 
102.  Our AEF Team deployed as a group. (Please fill in ONE circle.) 
O  Yes 
O  No 
 
 
103.  I have only deployed within my 90-day vulnerability window.  (Please fill in ONE 
circle.) 
O  Yes 
O  No 
 
104.  I received ample notification time prior to my deployment.  (Please fill in ONE 
circle.) 
O  Yes 




105.  We deployed from our home station, as a team, to the same deployment location.  
(Please fill in ONE circle.) 
O  Yes 
O  No 
  
106.  I deployed as an individual, by myself, from a different base.  (Please fill in ONE 
circle.) 
O  Yes 
O  No 
 
When answering the following questions, please consider the following “Work-Group”  
definition – people, from your home station, you work with on a daily basis to  
accomplish your work mission or objective. 
 
107.  If you are scheduled to deploy, how many people from your home station work-
group are scheduled to deploy to the 
same location?  _______  (Please fill in the blank) 
 
108.  How many people make up your home station work-group? _____ (Please fill in the 
blank) 
 
109.  Did you deploy with your work-group from your home station or did you deploy as 
an individual from a different base?  (Please fill in ONE circle.) 
O  Individual 
O  Home Station Work-Group 
 
110.  If you deployed as an individual, how long did it take you to feel as if you were part 
of the deployed team?  (Please  
fill in ONE circle.) 
O  Less than 7 days 
O  7 to 15 days 
O  16 to 30 days 
O  31 to 60 days 
O  61 to 90 days 
O  I never felt part of the deployed team 
 
111.  Our work-group has not deployed yet.  (Please fill in ONE circle.) 
O  Yes 








The following questions request personal information that will be used to create 
demographics for research purposes only.  ALL ANSWERS ARE STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL and, unless you wish to tell us your identity, all answers are 
anonymous.  No one outside the research team will ever see your questionnaire.  No 
identification of individual responses will occur.  We ask for some demographic 
information in order to interpret results more accurately and make comparisons 
between large groups. 
 
112.  What is your gender? 
O  Male 
O  Female 
 
113.  What is your age in years? 
114.  What is your Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)? 
115.  What is your rank? 
116.  At which base are you currently assigned? 
117.  To which Major Command (MAJCOM) are you currently assigned? 
118.  Are you currently married? 
119.  List the ages of any family members, other than a spouse, whom you would 
consider dependents. 
 
This completes the survey.  Thank you for your participation. 









Appendix D.  Constructs and Scale-Items 
Anxiety Scale-Items (Survey Questions 66 – 68) 
 
gf1 (#66):  The thought of this deployment worries/worried me. 
gf2 (#67):  I feel anxious about working wit members of other teams. 
gf3 (#68):  I am concerned with how I will fit in with the team. 
 
 
Group Unity Scale-Items (Survey Questions 54 – 56) 
 
grp-prf1 (#54):  Given the choice, I would prefer to deploy with members of my home  
  station work-group rather than deploy as an individual. 
grp-prf2 (#55):  I find working as a member of an AEF work-group increases my ability  
  to perform effectively. 
grp-prf3 (#56):  I generally prefer to work as part of a work-group. 
 
 
Work-Group Characteristics Scale-Items (Survey Questions 57 – 65) 
 
grp-sp1 (#57):   I have confidence that my deployed work-group can perform effectively. 
grp-sp2 (#58):   My deployed work-group can take on nearly any task and complete it. 
grp-sp3 (#59):   My deployed work-group has a lot of team spirit. 
dwg-ss1 (#60):  Being on my AEF work-group gives me the opportunity to provide  
  support to other AEF team members. 
dwg-ss2 (#61):  My work-group increases my opportunities for positive social  
  interaction. 
dwg-ss3 (#62):  When needed, members of my AEF work-group help each other out. 
cc-dwg1 (#63):  Members of my AEF work-group are willing to share information with  
  other team members about our work. 
cc-dwg2 (#64):  AEF work-groups enhance communication among people working on  
   the same deployment. 
cc-dwg3 (#65):  Members of my AEF work-group cooperate to get the mission  
   accomplished. 
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Deployment Commitment Scale-Items (Survey Questions 92 – 94) 
 
dep_com1 (#92):  I try to avoid deployments when possible. 
dep_com2 (#93):  I have problems working with others on deployments. 
dep_com3 (#94):  I avoid extra duties and responsibilities within the deployment. 
 
 
Team Cohesion Scale-Items (Survey Questions 80 – 91) 
 
tm-coh1 (#80):   Our deployed team is united in trying to succeed. 
tm-coh2 (#81):   I’m happy with my deployed team’s level of commitment to the mission. 
tm-coh3 (#82):   Our deployed team members have conflicting aspirations for the team’s  
    performance. 
tm-coh4 (#83):   The deployed team concept provides me opportunities to improve my  
    personal performance. 
tm-coh5 (#84):   Our deployed team would like to spend time together outside of work  
   hours. 
tm-coh6 (#85):   Members of our deployed team stick together outside of work time. 
tm-coh7 (#86):   Our deployed team members rarely socialize together. 
tm-coh8 (#87):   Members of our deployed team would rather go out on their own than  
   get together as a team. 
tm-coh9 (#88):   For me this deployed team is one of the most important social groups to  
   which I belong. 
tm-coh10 (#89):  Some of my best friends are on this deployed team. 
tm-coh11 (#90):  I am going to miss the members of my deployed team when this  
   deployment ends. 
tm-coh12 (#91):  If members of our deployed team have problems or concerns, everyone  











Team Effectiveness Scale-Items (Survey Questions 95 – 99) 
 
tm-eff1 (#95):  Compared to other work-groups I have been associated with, the  
 effectiveness of my work-group in this AEF Team Deployment is  
 excellent. 
tm-eff2 (#96):  My work-group was very effective on the deployment. 
tm-eff3 (#97):  All in all, this work-group was very competent. 
tm-eff4 (#98):  In my estimation, our work-group gets the work done effectively. 
tm-eff5 (#99):  My work-groups overall level of effectiveness was very high.
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Appendix E.  SPSS 10.1 Survey Scale-Item Descriptives 
 
Item (Survey Number) Sample Size Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Group Unity 1 (54) 
Group Unity 2 (55) 
Group Unity 3 (56) 
Work-Group Characteristics 1 (57) 
Work-Group Characteristics 2 (58) 
Work-Group Characteristics 3 (59) 
Work-Group Characteristics 4 (60) 
Work-Group Characteristics 5 (61) 
Work-Group Characteristics 6 (62) 
Work-Group Characteristics 7 (63) 
Work-Group Characteristics 8 (64) 
Work-Group Characteristics 9 (65) 
Individual Anxiety 1 (66) 
Individual Anxiety 2 (67) 
Individual Anxiety 3 (68) 
Team Cohesion 1  (80) 
Team Cohesion 2  (81) 
Team Cohesion 3  (82) 
Team Cohesion 4  (83) 
Team Cohesion 5  (84) 
Team Cohesion 6  (85) 
Team Cohesion 7  (86) 
Team Cohesion 8  (87) 
Team Cohesion 9  (88) 
Team Cohesion 10 (89) 
Team Cohesion 11 (90) 
Team Cohesion 12 (91) 
Deployment Commitment 1 (92) 
Deployment Commitment 2 (93) 
Deployment Commitment 3 (94) 
Team Cohesion 1 (95) 
Team Cohesion 2 (96) 
Team Cohesion 3 (97) 
Team Cohesion 4 (98) 



















































































































































































Appendix F.  Survey Comments 
 
• The AEF concept isn't being properly applied to tanker bases.  Currently we cover 
nearly every AEF at several locations at one time.   There is no down period to 
regroup.  An effort should be given to align the given tanker wings with an AEF 
rotation, and other taskings.  Even while participating in an AEF we are tasked to 
the point of not having enough people on station to properly complete the flying 
hour program.  Proof can be seen in our QA stats, and overdue training.  We have 
an associate Air Reserve unit that flys our Aircraft, about 30% of the flying on 
any given day.  But only provides about 40 ARTs (air reserve technicians), less 
than 10% of our manning. That statement doesn't even take other squadrons that 
are directly effected by aircraft maint.  Very often these technicians are working 
unit duties in the office rather than working normal AFSC. 
 
• The AEF concept sounds good on paper, but the air force has too many 
commitmentments for it to work properly. why are people deployed in support of 
operation "enduring Freedom" not being rotated out? there are plenty of others to 
take their place. Places like PSAB need to be either short tours or closed 
completely.  Deploying to places like that every 15 months to do nothing is 
complete BULLSHIT. 
 
• I am a First Sergeant at McConnell.  When McConnell gets a tasking, the shirts 
are picked off the top of the list, when they return our name goes to the bottom of 
the list.  There have been no problems, to my knowledge, with one of the shirts 
filling the First Sergeant position. 
 
• I've never been deployed!!!!! 
 
• Never deployed as part of an AEF rotation. 
 
• I am not world wide deployable due to sleep Apena  
 
• Survey not consistent.  Tells you to disregard certain questions if never deployed, 
however, asks questions later about deployment (NOT asked to disregard) 
 
• Too many variables at this time I think to speak of the effectiveness of the AEF 
concept.  Although the days of Palace Tenure type taskings have decreased, we 
still see many short notice notifications.  Our biggest challenge is in specific 
career fields such as fire truck mechanics(2T332A).  In a critical field such as this, 
retainability remains a struggle as these guys are just over tasked.  We fully 
understand this is not the only career field facing such struggles, but I don't see 
how this situation will be remedied without increased manpower authorizations.  
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Someone really needs to think out of the box on this one to come up with some 
way to keep these guys. 
 
• We have 2 AEF packages and 1 AEW package here at Cannon. One of the 
problems I have with the AEF concept is that once assigned to a package you 
cannot be changed except for extreme circumstances. Those of us on AEF are 
basically guaranteed to be deployed once a year while AEW people go on the 
bubble but have never deployed since I have been here. This is unfair to those of 
us on AEF spending 3 months every year in the desert while AEW goes nowhere 
or if they do go they are usually used for filling in stateside TDY's that most 
people actually WANT to go on. Personally I think the AEF is not a bad idea but 
its implementation has been bugged with problems. Also, I am sick of hearing the 
blatant lie by my leadership telling me that the AEF concept "Keeps you home 
more" because that simply IS  NOT TRUE! There are the same amount of 
personnel and the same amount of slot to be filled in deployed locations BEFORE 
there was an AEF concept. The AEF concept did not magically wisk away slots in 
Saudi...it ha made it easier to plan when you will be deploying for the most part 
but it has in no way kept anyone "home more" except for those on AEW who 
never go anywhere. 
 
• I FEEL THE AEF CONCEPT DOES NOT WORK.  MY SPOUSE IS ALSO 
MILITARY, AND THIS IS HIS FOURTH TDY IN EIGHT YEARS, 2 SINCE 
THE AEF CONCEPT.  WE HAVE NEVER DEPLOYED ON OUR ASSIGHED 
AEF'S.  THIS IS WHAT MAKE IT HARD WITH FAMILIES.  I HAD A 10 
DAY NOTICE ON MY LAST DEPLOYMENT, AND I DID NOT GO WITH 
ANYONE FROM MY BASE.  I ALMOST HAD TO GO AGAIN LESS THAN 
A YEAR LATER, LIKE MY HUSBAND DID. 
 
• I am not assigned to an AEF (I am at HYT and affected by stop/loss, should be on 
terminal leave right now), but some of my answers are based on my deployment 
during Allied Force.  I think the AEF rotation concept is great. However, there are 
still to many last minute short notice taskings.  These make it harder for units to 
properly manage their personnel for their scheduled rotations.   
  
• I am sorry I have never deployed so these questions are like an unknown foreign 
language to me! 
 
• I think the idea of the AEF concept is good, but we don't have enough people in 
the Air Force to work it the way it should.  I don't understand what the "TEAM" 
and "GROUP" thing is.  I just returned from a 90 day rotation in PSAB on 
01Sep01.  Now I have to worry about deploying to support my unit in Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  On top of that I still have the lovely thought of getting orders 
to Korea.  My base was not the lead unit for this AEF, but since the base who was 
couln't support it, we are supporting them with 20-30 bodies.  No, I don't think the 
AEF concept is very effective at all.  The AEF concept was supposed to cut down 
on an individuals deployments and give them more notice of deploying when all it 
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has seemed to have done is increase deployments.  Like I said above, I just got 
back from 90days on AEF6, now I will most likely be going to support Op 
Enduring Freedom in March, and I still have to worry about getting orders to 
Korea. My squadron doesn't have the manpower to suppport slots to PSAB, a 
dependant, and independant package for AEF. 
 
• I based my info from my last assignement as I'm currently in a job where I'm not 
part of the AEF rotation. 
 
• I wasn't a good candidate for this survey because I haven't deployed or gone TDY. 
I just received my citizenship in April and I am waiting for my retraining 
application. Therefore, I haven't experienced any problems with deployment or 
TDY.  
 
• Volunteer oppertuinities with the AEF program could be changed a little allowing 
volunteers to take members position with members consent. 
 
• This survey does not allow accurate answers. My unit is currently deployed due to 
the AEF window and the recent world events. What this survey doesn't touch on 
are those left behind, the fact that all our technicians were deployed, leaving 
behind 10 health care providers without enlisted tech support to try to continue on 
the mission. You request information on the deployed, but how about those left 
behind to work without support? I am not on mobility, so I will not deploy. But 
my support staff is gone, and now we have doctors who can't see patients because 
all the support staff (records, admin, med techs, etc) are all deployed, leaving no 
one here to assist in patient care. A health care provider cannot do it all by 
himself. You also did not expand your questions to consider military married to 
miltary, but stationed at separate bases, and having different AEF windows, and 
its affect on morale. If you keep this survey as it is, then at least allow a comment 
section for each question so people could expand if needed to clarify their 
answers. Thank you. 
 
• Even though I have been in the Air Force over four years, I have not had the 
opportunity to deploy yet.  My husband is also active duty and has had to deploy 
several times and is scheduled for yet another one.  Despite the AEFs good 
intentions, I think that back shops are over looked in that they support several 
AEFs instead of one or two which puts a constant stain on the shops as far as 
manning is concerned. 
 
• If given the choice I would rather deploy with individuals from my duty station. I 
deployed this past summer with 2 individuals from my base and 3 from other 
bases. On a short TDY you spend a good month just learning everyone's skills and 
personalities. This slowed down the progress of work I wanted to accomplish 
during the TDY. In a nut shell when you know your people you can get right to 




• Most of the questions pertain to people who have deployed, unfortunately i 
haven't deployed since the gulf war so i really couldn't answer your questions 
fully.  
 
• In my career field we almost always deploy individually, due to manning.  I was 
also made aware that if you are an alternate and you do not deploy you don't 
deploy again just as if you went.  This is unfair.  I might deploy every year 
because I'm a primary, but if I were an alternate I might only be expected to go 
every 2 years.  Maybe I am wrong in my understanding but either way the Air 
Force should clarify this procedure to make sure some individuals get there 
chance to go TDY. 
 
• I understand the AEF and work group concepts.  Being a 3A0, I have not yet had 
the oportunity to deploy with a work-group.  I feel that there would be advantages 
to it.  ALL individuals need to understand how AEF applies, and to learn that we 
are doing our job.  It's wasn't easy when 9-11 happened to work continual 12 hr 
shifts or on weekends, but military members need to be aware that things happen.  
I love my job, love the Air Force, and no matter how my life or personal affairs 
are going I am more than willing to deploy.  I simply wish others felt the same 
way or didn't complain about it verbally. 
 
• I have never deployed and would like the chance. Why does it seem that some 
squadrons get to go all the time and some don't? I joined the military to see the 
world and travel however, all I have seen is Texas and Arizona...basic training 
and my first duty section! I would like to see a better rotation. I left a lot of blank 
questions for the reason that I have no information on deploying...since I never 
had the opportunity. 
 
• This survey was entirely too long. 
 
• The AEF concept was good on paper.  I feel it does not work for Security Forces.  
Now I know with the "new" OEF it is totally broken.  Now everyone is talking 
about all rotations going to 6 months which I feel is totally broken.  Maybe we 
should shut down some of the "rotations" instead of adding more and more of 
them with the few personnel we have.  Making all rotations 6 month will 
definetely push personnel to get out.  I have almost 14 years in and I'm thinking of 
getting out.  My family means more to me than any "TDY" to the desert ever will.  
I have a working wife unlike allot of Military families.  When I'm gone she has it 
very hard trying to balance a career and a family on her own.  I it to bad the 
military does not conform to working wives or husbands.  I feel the whole TDY 
thing has gotten out of hand.  Hopefully I will be quoted on this and actually 
heard.  
 
• The AEF work-group concept is particularly tricky for us small career fields.  I 
have not deployed since the AEF implementation.  I was, however, picked up for 
an out-of-cycle deployment in response to Operation Noble Eagle, Enduring 
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Freedom, with a 3-5 day turn-around.  Plenty of time, however, there was a lot of 
talk and consternation with regard to the actual tasking.  All in all, I like the 
concept, but again, with small career field, staying with the AEF rotation concept, 
we run into problems every time an individual PCSs.  For instance, when I PCS it 
is unlikely that I will remain in my current AEF due to Command and base 
requirements.  I will be reassigned to fulfill the mission at the given location. 
 
• This concept is not 100% on line. You still wonder whether or not you are going 
to deploy. With our shop manning, you really don't feel safe. You're almost 
always "on the hook" or deploying.  
 
• "I answered questions 69 thru 79 inadvertently.   
 
• I can't answer questions about work teams when I haven't deployed yet! 
 
• "I have deployed four times and I have always deployed as an individual and not 
as a part of an AEF team. I have loved my job and the people I worked with on 
every deployment I participated in. When I am deployed, I am there to work and 
and give 100% to the mission and what needs to be done. Yes, I miss my daughter 
when I am deployed and she misses me but she also understands that I am in the 
Air Force and Air Force members go where then are needed. While I am deployed 
I do not need to be with numerous individuals who know me and are constantly 
reminding me of home and what I am missing there. I prefer to be with individual 
who do not know me and that I can get to know and disscuss current events that 
we have in common at our deployed location. Additionally, I prefer to have some 
input as to where I am going and when I am going. Our unit had a list that 
consisted of all individuals assigned to our unit. Each deployment was 
documented on this list. You could look as the list to see if your name was 
coming to the top of the list, which meant a deployment was in your near future 
and plan from there. You could then look at the projected TDY's for the next year 
and volunteer for the one that you wanted to fill, location and cycle. This is the 
method I prefer to use." 
 
• Although i have been TDY more times than i can count in my career, i have never 
been on an AEF rotation and am not currently scheduled for one. Survey may be 
better directed toward those individuals that have deployed under this concept. 
 
• SURVEY TOOOOO LONG AND IT ASK TO MANY OF THE SAME 
QUESTIONS "IF YOU WANT GOOD HONEST ANSWERS AND NOT 
SOMEONE JUST TRYING TO COMPLETE SURVEY SHORTEN IT. 
 
• "I do not support the AEF concept because it has done nothing to add 
predictability for my men and it eliminates the choices for commanders.  I say it 
does not add predictability because UTCs have changed buckets between AEF 
cylce 2 and AEF cycle 3.  I was in AEF bucket 10 during cycle 2 and bucket 1 
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during cycle 3; essentially I am hot to deploy for 6 months straight.  If you want 
to document specific examples just look at the EOD UTC taskings. 
 
• "When the AEF program started, individuals in my unit were not assigned to a 
particular rotation for the duration of their assignment at Cannon.  Some people 
were assigned as alternate on one or more rotations while being assigned as 
primary on another.  At that time, all the rotations were for odd numbered AEFs, 
which were scheduled to deploy to SWA.  At the beginning of the second cycle, 
Cannon's rotation assignments were ""realigned"" to even numbered AEFs, again 
being deployed only in support of SWA.  While I was deployed, I was 
""educated"" by ACC and CENTAF personnel on the purpose of AEF, and that 
individuals were supposed to be assigned to one AEF, and only one, as either 
primary or alternate, but not both.  I am now being told the AEF schedule is once 
more being ""realigned"", making Cannon responsible for supporting odd-
numbered AEFs, scheduled to deploy yet again to SWA.  Where precisely is the 
equity in this?  After the third AEF cycle, Cannon personnel would have spent 
three cycles, approximately 45 months, being vulnerable to deploy ONLY to 
SWA, with a select few deployments to other locations.  It appears to me and 
several others I have talked to that if the cycles are continually having to be 
realigned, the concept must not be working as advertised.  Of course, if the 
managers of this concept would leave the program alone for more than just one 
cycle, it may just work itself out.  Of course, if they did that, someone wouldn't be 
able to take credit for ""improving the system,"" would they? 
 
• Deployments should go back to the old way of volunteers.  The AEF concept does 
not work!  There are to many positions to fill and not enough people to fill them 
like the AEF concept was supposed to work. 
 
• The PRUs and mobility processors need to pay close attention to all reporting 
instructions, as they may be radically different from home-base standards and 
differ from AOR to AOR.   
 
• It would be nice if this form had you exclude ALL the areas that do not apply.  
Only 2 small sections say to skip the area if you have never deployed.  The form 
COULD be set up with conditional fields that REMOVE all the unanswerable 
questions (do to lack of deployment) after you make the 'I have never been 
deployed' choice in question 2.  thanks 
 
• AEF is a good concept for instalations, but what happens when an individual 
PCS's from one AEF prime base into another AEF prime base.  Many of us have 
AFSC's that only allow certain base choices.  In other words- You can stay AEF 
prime for 3 years.  This has happend and is still happening today.  
 
• When deploying as Security Forces you don't have these names like "work-
group".  The major problem with the Air Force to day is "we" are not a military 
entity. The SF are one of the few that still function as a military unit.  When I step 
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into the office it is good morning TSgt not hey Bob.  Many of these "work-group" 
concepts you refer to are tearing down the back bone of military employment.  
When a troop of mine is given the order to defend the base.  I expect, yes sir! Not, 
who me? or where is that written?  You preach this AEF concept yet we 
continuously send our unit to the same location (PSAB). Fortunately fo me I have 
been able to avoid that particular base for other bases in the AOR. So I know it 
possible to get other TDY locations. My fellow airmen are not so lucky and have 
nothing to look forward to except the same (PSAB) deployment. Then expect us 
to perform as soliders yet treat us as luggage. I know there is more thatn one base 
to send an AEF to. You do the math and talk to the bases that don't deploy as 
often.  I talk to people all the time and ask when were you in the desert?  Nine 
times out of ten the answer is never.  Share the load we are tired here at Shaw.  I 
can not relate to your "business mentality" when I am in the military. 13 people 
assigned to a squadron a little difference makes in large units.  There is nothing 
more depressing than a 90 to 120 day prison sentence.  What happen to pay 
incentives?  V/R 
 
• This was my first AEF deployment.  Overall, I had no complaints and the people I 
worked with on this deployment were fantastic and ready to help out with 
anything.  I could not have worked with a better group of people.  I believe 
deployments bring people closer together to work as a team and makes a positive 
impact when they return to their homestation. 
 
• The survey is confusing in that certain sections tell you not to answer questions if 
you have not deployed yet in other sections it asks you questions that assume you 
have deployed.  I myself have not deployed on an AEF, but some of the questions 
really are not clear if I should asnwer them or not.  Also, some sections do not 
allow you to clear the option button if you mark it by mistake.  The survey should 
be broken up into two portions.  Those that have deployed on AEFs and those that 
haven't.  This would eliminate any confusion. 
 
• Although I am assigned to DM and I deployed at the same time they did to the 
same location, I deployed as a core slot not as a member of the fighter squadron.  
It still made things easier for my position because as a QA inspector I worked 
closely with all fighter and rescue squadrons that deployed.  Knowing some of the 
key personnel and how they work made my job a little easier.  The AEF concept 
works but the communication process needs to be improved.  Knowing when 
you're going isn't enough.  Knowing what to expect when you get there would 
eliviate some of the stress that a lot of people feel.  I think all personnel should be 
required to deploy at one time or another.  I see a lot of people make excuses why 
they can't deploy and supervisors who let them get away with it. The deployment 
windows are nice but they don't really work for me.  I volunteer to deploy during 
portions of the year when I know that my family doesn't have a lot going on 
 
• "While I think the overall creation of the AEF,AEW packages was to try to ease 
the deployment burden on personnel and their families, manning in the 2W0X1 
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career field here at Cannon is not sufficient to fill two AEF's and one AEW.  We 
may have 160 personnel assigned(appx. 208 authorized), but they are not all 
deployable.  This means, personnel get shuffled around (even if it is temporary) 
from one AEF/AEW to another to fill shortages made by those individuals who 
did not plan leaves around thier windows for deployment or were tasked for other 
training TDY's.  Under this concept we have personnel that may have just 
completed a TDY or time on the bubble scenerio that are placed on the bubble 
again to backfill.  Here at Cannon we have folks assigned to AEW on the bubble 
8 months out of a year, every other year under this four months on four months 
off rotation.  I was assigned to the AEW two years ago and am now on an AEF 
package.  Understanding that they say that when you're placed on a package that 
is the one you stay on, however, someone forgot to tell that to all concerned when 
looking at creating packages. And a statement made by an ACC group of 
personnel that visited Cannon earlier this year to brief us on the AEF concept, the 
way I and others understood it, ONLY the Air Force Chief of Staff could waive 
requirements for swapping personnel on packages.  This is weak at best, by the 
time a waiver is routed for approval/disapproval, the personnel would be off the 
bubble again.  One more reason why leadership would not to foreward a request.  
I would be curious to know how many request are recieved for his signature a 
year, might make someone ask the question why dont we get these.  Guarantee 
Cannon has not sent a request.  Please dont take this as a complaint against the 
concept, just stating the way things work at ground level versus the way they were 
created on paper. " 
 
• The AEF concept does not work effectively in the small career fields like 
contracting. I also don't like the concept. I prefer the freedom to be able to 
volunteer for TDYs that come up and not be limited to a window. I would rather 
be deployed than to be at my home station and I think the Air Force should allow 
individuals such as myself that opportunity. I understand the need for stability for 
some career fields but contracting does not deployee as much as some of the other 
career fields.  
 
• Team deployment concept is not in-place yet for CE.  It is really starting in AEF 
Cycle 3.  Predictability is out the window with AEF Cycle 3 bucket changes. 
 
• Disregard items 73-99 and 102-111 above because the last time I deployed was in 
1999 prior to AEF.  However, I strongly disaggree with the AEF team concept for 
support agencies where their duties do not change/decrease at their home stations. 
 
• The AEF concept is geared toward the flight-line people and does not even come 
close to taking into account the back shops. We are effected by EVERY 
deployment and TDY. It's great that the flight-line only goes once a year and the 
ones and twos for core or whatever the rest of the year. The back shops on the 
other hand have to belly up every time someone goes any where. The amount of 
people you are forced to send are ridicules and then the amount of times we fill 
core slots at locations we don't even have jets deployed to........ who thought this 
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was a good idea. We could talk about the differences between how aircrew and 
maintainence people are treated, tents opposed to hard billets, pay, the ability to 
swap out, but I suppose you will give me that old song and dance about crew rest, 
think about this, the best pilot in the world in a crappy aircraft isn't going to be 
very effective. In closing, we have guys who volunteer to go on every deployment 
that comes up but the stupid restrictions you have imposed won't allow this to 
happen. Again, who in there right mind thought this was a good idea. Am I the 
only one who thinks a guy who wants to be TDY will do a hell of alot better job 
than someone forced to go!!!!!!!!! 
 
• I really hate deploying, that is the one thing in the entire Air Force that draws me 
away.  I deployed like a mad man when I was a cop, now I have retrained, its not 
so bad, but the constant PCSing and tearing up roots is strain enough, the TDY 
thing is just almost about to push me out the door unless something changes.  
Maybe the US military can get its nose out of everyones business and take care of 
our problems at home, where was the vote that declared us to be the worlds police 
force?  I know I had no say in that, and alot of the countries we are in would wish 
us out as well..  change is what is needed, not putting a bandaid over a 2 foot 
gash. 
 
• This survey is based on my last squadron. i PCA'd right after we returned from 
our AEF.  We were there for four months and swapped out half way. My new 
squadron is very supportive and my work-group supervisor is very understanding 
and i have no stresses as i did with my last squadron. I would like to let you know 
these decisions were made concerning the second half of my deployment.  The 
first half ran very smoothly.  my work-group supervisor was very supportive and 
very effective in both our personal lives and letting us get our job done.  i was 
very pleased with my first half deployment.  The second half, my work-group 
supervisor was very insecure (i felt) and made if very difficult for everone that 
worked for him.  it was very stressful for what and where we were at.   
 
• At the current tate I will be deployed 3 months of every 15 months.  That is not at 
all appealing!!  I have listened to many briefings on how the AEF concept is 
"supposed" to work.  However, in reality it isn't implemented according to the 
"rules".  For instance, the base is supposed to name a person to fill a certain 
rotation.  The last several months are supposed to be being spent preparing for 
that deployment.  Instead, someone is named last minute and the person has days 
or weeks to get ready.  The feedback back is that everyone is subject to 
deployment at any time and should be ready at any time to deploy.  That makes 
day to day life very stressful and isn't realistic.  Members have jobs to do which 
they are doing with less manpower.  They simply don't have time to get 
themselves ready to deploy.  To top it all off, by not naming a person, nobody is 
getting the advantage of not facing a deployment for 15 months in the event they 
don't have to go.  Consequently, members are getting notice too late in the 
process.  Not fair to anyone.  Lastly, I have heard too many JAGs talk about how 
they want to deploy (defend country, single, want excitement, career progression 
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etc.)but they can't because they aren't at the right base or in the right job position.  
Then on the other hand, you have people being deployed who don't want to due to 
family situations etc.  It isn't that those who don't want to deploy love their 
country any less but if they have really young children at home or a sick loved 
one or a baby on the way, they would rather do their job in a geographical area 
close to home.  Common sense would seem to dictate that those who want to go 
should have sort of first dibs on going.  I know this won't work for all career 
fields, but in the JAG career field, we deploy onzies and twozies rather than large 
groups.  I love the Air Force but the idea of leaving my three children under 5 and 
my husband who is enrolled in medical school has created a significant amount of 
stress.  Combine that with incredibly undermanning, life in the Air Force is 
unusually stressful these days.  In concept, the AIF concept is good, it just needs 
some tweeking! 
 
• I believe the AEF concept is a good one and will be very effective once all of the 
bugs are worked out.  The only issue I have with it presently is that I have been on 
either AEF or AEW stand-by nonstop for the last 12 months.  I have been 
fortunate enough not to have deployed during any of those times.  However, my 
understanding was that once you were on the bubble, you were not eligble to go 
on the bubble again for 12-15 months (I forget which).  When I questioned why I 
was continuosly on stand-by, I was told because the base had been tasked and I 
was the only one who was qualified to meet the requirements set forth in the 
tasking and that had not recently deployed (within the last year).  Seems to me 
that someone in a position of authority should come down with clear cut rules as 
to when a person can and cannot be placed on AEF stand-by and distribute it out 
to everyone in the AF so if your boss is doing something their not suppose to, you 
will have the guidance to bring it to their attention. 
 
• Every time I have deployed it has been as an individual to a base where nobody 
else from my base deployed to.  We all train together, but only the pilots and 
maintainers deploy together.  We support folks never deploy together.  Also, my 
base was moved up in the AEF cycle from AEF 9 last year to AEF 7 this year, so 
we actually deployed 9 months after we returned.  So much for predictability. 
 
• The AEF concept works well for fighter squadrons and folks assigned to a fighter 
squadron.  The Munitions flight dosen't support one squadron it supports all 
squadrons.  The number of personnel deploying will depend on how many planes 
it takes. It would be better, I feel, if we didn't have to use the AEF work group, 
concept. Most of the time the deployment requires a certian skill level or a certian 
job discription.  What we end up doing is swapping one person from one AEF 
cycle to fill the requirement for another one. Under the AEF concept we are not 
suppose to do this, my understanding is if you are assigned to an AEF Group you 
should always stay with that group no matter what, that isn't always possible.  If 
we try to do a reclama, the upper level of supervison doesn't want to here we can't 
support a deployment.  I also feel we get overtasked when we deploy.  For 
example, our last deployment for AEF 9/10, Langley 2W0X1's were tasked with 
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suppporting Avionics package, ECS slots and TCN slot. We were able to reclama 
the TCN slot, do to supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, but another flight in 
EMS had to pick it up.  I feel other units that are not supporting an AEF package 
should pick up the TCN slots.  I feel using Munitions personnel is a waste of 
manning.  You are taking personnel away from home station, who are needed to 
support the daily flying missions, or are needed to support local TDY's. Example 
the Red Flags, WIC's, WSEP's.  Now if our manning was at 100% I don't feel this 
would be a problem.  Bottom Line AEF works for personnel assigned to a fighter 
squadron and not back shops who support the whole base. 
 
• I have never deployed on an AEF.  I've been on many UTCs, been part of many 
teams, but never deployed.  My bosses won't let me because I'm needed at home 
station.  Hence, a lot of my answers are based on running the deployment process 
through the Personnel Readiness Unit (PRU).  In AMC, AEF is not fair nor 
followed.  The Ops folks go for 30-35 days, support goes for 90-120 days.  Ops 
may go 2-3 times a year, but their days never quite add up to what everyone else 
has to do.  Units are also very bad/good at continually swapping folks out, so 50% 
of deployers received only a few days notice.  Add 11 Sep, and AEF has become 
completely ineffective.  AF has done a really poor job in communicating the 
overall concept of "Mission first" to the troops.  On the one hand, they tell the 
troops "stability is the key" and expect only 120 days max TDY/deployment in a 
15 month period.  Then, they tell commanders either directly or through various 
programs like SORTS, FILL YOUR UTCS and they better be qualified.  So when 
a commander is required to ensure only qualified people deploy, he/she has to 
make the tough call to make people go more than 90-120 days.  So, the 
commander is now the bad guy and the "heros" are the AEF folks who set the 
concept, but make commanders comply with the mission.  For example, my 
section only has 60% 5 levels or above.  I'm tasked for 50% of my authorizations 
to deploy.  You're AFIT students, so you can do the math.  I either completely 
decimate my overhead or I double task folks.  If I had to support AEF 3 with all 
my UTCs, the MPF would be run by a SSgt retrainee as the highest ranking 
person left.  The two major questions are "Has AEF provided stability for the 
troops - Yes, more so than past system" "Is AEF being followed as the concept 
has been briefed?-not by a longshot".  Add to the mix the fact someone 
(AF/MAJCOM, I don't know) is increasing unit tasked codes at all bases, adding 
significant number of escort duty UTCs and the numbers don't add up.  AF 
stopped being fun because we have different rules for different people, (pilots vs 
support), we can't do everything we're required to do, so we make it harder by 
hiring contractors to take our place.  Yep, the challenges mount, the answers 
disappear, but us folks in the middle bear the brunt of getting the mission 
accomplished.  Enjoy AFIT and keep asking questions to programs you can't fix 
or do anything about.  AEF is great to use to tell Congress, "we've provided 
stability".  Other than that, it's just another irritant. 
 
• My current unit does not employ the work-group concept.  Individuals are ranked 
according to grade, afsc and date of last deployment.  When a tasking is received 
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volunteers are requested, the slots that are not filled are taken from the rack and 
stack order that our flight management maintains.  Each AEF deployment is 
comprised of different personnel and it is hard to gauge exactly when an 
individual is vulnerable.  To me there seems little change to us as compared to the 
old system.  There really is no predictability on taskings.  If you are first on the 
rack and stack list then most probably you will be selected to deploy.  The process 
is often confusing for Information Managers, as our career field has a rift where 
we are used as personnelists and are often told by several different people where 
we will go and when.  This seems to be a common problem I have encountered, 
and thus it creates a sense of "who knows when" for many of us.  I realize we are 
to be ready for anything at anytime, but the notification process, while effective 
for many career fields, does not seem to work well for ours.  That may just be my 
perception from my own experience, but I have run into others who have had the 
same thing occur to/with them.  That is why I plan on cross-training to a more 
defined career field (3C) where my job will pretty much stay the same, regardless 
of squadron assignment, which plays a role as to our AFSC placement...(many get 
assigned to orderly rooms as second-hand personnelists.) 
 
• There are too many things missing from this survey. The questions are designed 
to give you answers you want to here. However, many questions are left out that 
could be added. Many of the questions in the survey don't have an answer I would 
like to give. Therefore, I couldn't answer acurately. The good thing about 
individual deployments without a home base team is one gets to meet new people 
that have different learned experiences to gain knowledge from. Of course, it's 
good to work with a team from your own base, but it's also good to work with 
people you don't know. When you only work with people from your own base, 
you miss out on extra knowledge from others. There are a lot of others issues that 
make this a bad survey, but who wants to write a book about them. On the other 
hand, it's difficult to create a good acurate survey. I left some answers blank 
because I didn't know the answer and one specificly: 109 because I've done both 
but there isn't a selection for both. 
 
• I consider the whole AEF concept much worse than the old individualized system 
of deploying.  When I first deployed in 1994 I was given less advance notice 
(only about a month), but I was told from the beginning where I was going, when 
I had to be there, and when I was leaving - and that did not change, so I could 
plan appropriately. When I deployed again in 2000 under AEF, we were told 
farther in advance that we would deploy, but we were kept guessing right up to a 
few days prior just exactly where we were going and when we would leave. That's 
not very stable and predictable, and AEF was supposed to provide that. Also, the 
AEF rotation system results in everybody in a deployed location leaving within a 
few weeks and turnover to the new crew is sketchy (at best) since there is so little 
overlap time. The end result is that the new crew spends the first month and a half 
figuring out what the previous crew did (and correcting anything they did wrong), 
and finally gets into the "swing of things" in the last month and a half when it's 
almost time to leave. I was NCOIC of a workcenter at Eskan Village in 2000 and 
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the NCOIC I was replacing left a week and a half before I got there, so I got my 
"overlap briefing," such as it was, from the lone airman remaining from the 
previous crew. (Moreover, there was equipment we were asked to use that no one 
was trained on since the tasking requirements hadn't mentioned it.) Under the old 
individualized deployment system, rotations were spread out so new people were 
rotated in gradually instead of all at once, giving them a chance to get "spun up" 
while previous crews were still there. This made for a much, much smoother 
transition. My deployment experience in 1994 was much better than the 
"Keystone Cops" mess we went through in 2000 with AEF. 
 
• Ops Tempo prior to Sep 11 was already v. high.  With Noble Eagle & Enduring 
Freedom taskings thrown in, AEF vunerability/scheduling has basically gone out 
the window.  Squadrons are ghost towns, group staff functions (OGT/OGV/etc) 
have ground to a halt, wing staffs are pulling double/triple duty to keep the 
mission going - Reserve & Guard units are picking up 40-50% of the mission.  
Bottom line:  AEF concept is broke.  Morale still high.  Committment to AF & the 
mission is high.  Quality of life is pretty low." 
 
• I deployed outside my AEF which is OK because my career field is small.  
Myself, along with 4 others had 3 hours notice to deploy.  I'm not familiar with 
the term "work-group" 
 
• Obviously the current AEF concept in its current time is failing. It was a great 
concept to get things off the ground, but there are too many commitments out 
there to continue current AEF concepts. Deploy individually, in core tasks for 
Oerations Northern & Southern watch. The predictabilty was better planned, and 
the burden to deploy so many people from one unit was relieved. There were 
always more people left to get the job done, rather than taxing our resources 
because a third of your flight and equipment was sent to the desert. Predictability 
was never a reason to start the AEF concept. Under the old system notification 
was always at least 6 months,, now under AEF even though you know your 
window, and can plan, you're always playing catch up after you return, and the 
lists for the packages to determine who is actually deploying on a given rotation 
average less than 3 months notification. When you deploy in a team group 
concept, you take any issues that may exist at your home station with you. The 
barriers and attitudes are already in place when you arrive, and the majority of the 
time, they are negative. there is no level of flexibility in the current AEF concept. 
I don't like being assigned to a particular bucket. and then never being able to 
manage that bucket within the flight. Your in this bucket and thats it. That equates 
to poor management. If you have the numbers you can plan, and if your allowed 
to manage those numbers accordingly you can relive allot of burden. 
 
• With all of the extra deployments becuase of Sept 11, 2001, I would think that 




• Bucket jumping should be allowed.  Due to my job in the back shop.  We DO 
NOT deploy with the AEF.  Because of that, when the word comes down for us to 
deploy,  I perfer to take my own "hand-picked" work group.    And because of the 
AEF bucket concept.  When and support TDY come up (far, few, and in-between)  
I can not give it to anyone outside of the AEF bucket.  As a manager this severly 
ties my hands.  AEF works great for the Flight-line people, but is totally 
unworkable at the back shop level (CRS squadron). TDY's are a great incentive 
and reward at my level, let me control who goes every now and then. 
 
• First, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in the 
AEF survey.  However, not being deployed, I was unable to answer any questions 
that were not of a personal opinion.  But being a Senior NCO in a squadron that 
does deploy I do hear to negative and positive feedback.  With the positive 
feedback being the majority.  As for my personal opinion of the AEF concept, I 
wholeheartly like the concept compared to what we had prior to.  Personnel know 
when they will deploy and know when they will be returning.  That is fine with a 
pre-identfied location with continuity set in place, but what happens when 
"WAR" is declared?  People are told they will be in certain locations for a specify 
timeframe and when that timeframe have come and gone.  Mind sets, morale and 
personalities begin to surface.  All because of "MANAGEMENT", Command and 
Control!  Of course, the mission is first priority, however you must understand 
your people and they must have a clear understanding where they fit into the 
mission.  Communciation must flow both ways from the lowest ranking person to 
highest ranking person within a "Work Group" and vice-verse.  Well, I think I 
will get off of my "soap-box" for a minute.  Again thanks for giving me the 
opportunity to voice my opinion...even if it's only one.   
 
• The AEF concept has no basis in reality and does not take into consideration the 
hundreds of different scenarios in which we might deploy. The artifical 
restrictions/limitations placed on us causes far more grief, aggrivation and 
paperwork than the old system of a "hot list" and of course the whole program 
went out the window after Sep 11. Obviously no foresight on someones part. It's 
unfortunate that we no longer have the latitude to select the best or most qualified 
personnel to deploy. Situations and locations vary, you can't set our lives in stone. 
No consideration was given to the folks who had to implement this program at 
base level. Waivers, waivers, waivers, point papers, email messages, guidance, 
more guidance........it's terrible! It's micromanagement at its worst. If we are 
unable to take care of our own troops then fire us and get someone who can. I 
hope the individual who implemented this plan enjoys their promotion. The rest 
of us are being forced to clean up their mess. If you haven't gathered I'm not to 
fond of the topic. I'm the Superintendent of our UDM shop and no one (outside of 
our squadron) seems to listen or care about our concerns. 
 
• I'm not thouroghly satisfied with the group concept implimentations, as a shop 
(sublevel of my deployed group) we had one airman by himself from a different 
base, everything ended up working ok, but as a 4 man team maybe they should 
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have left one of us home and brought 1 more person from that airmans shop.  I 
know its a little thing but I'm sure he would have felt more comfortable in the 
begining. Other than that I think the group deployment is the smartest thing the 
military can do, I know and trust each one of my coworkers and supervisors and 
know the limitations or strenghts of each person wich ensures that all jobs can be 
done as efficiently as possible. 
 
• I have personally not deployed too much in my opinion. In fact, it has only been 
once for a period of about two weeks with Guard Unit from a different area. I felt 
accepted and very much part of their team. My decision to get out of the Air 
Force was made before I joined and nothing that I have experienced has really 
made me hate the Air force. I am not really a military-career "type". If I was, I 
would be very much inclined to stay in. I have found my experiences in the Air 
Force to be good overall. I hope this information is helpful. 
 
• I think the AEF concept is still in work and will be more effecient when it comes 
together. 
 
• "The overall idea of the AEF is good, however I don't feel it is being used 
properly, people are continually being moved to differnt AEF's within the Wing. 
 
• The AEF concept as a whole is good, but using the large cold war UTC's causes a 
problem.  The AEF is for small modular UTC's and the cold war UTC's should be 
scrapped and redone.  Also, telling people that they can predict when they will 
deploy 15 months or more ahead is unrealistic.  Especially as short handed as the 
AF is, certain bases are hit in every AEF to support one or the other, especially 
Dyess that supports ACC and AMC, but we do not have the manning to deploy 
both and support home station operations.  I am a UDM so I have a broad 
understanding of this process at Dyess and this is the truth, Dyess is hurting as is 
every other base I am sure. 
 
• When will the AEF Center realize that the "AEF" Concept is great for wings that 
deploy with aircraft, but for support personnel it only taxes us harder without any 
relief at home station?  Prior to implementation of AEF, we had no problem 
filling all tasking with volunteers.  But now, with the AF trying to manage flights 
from a HQ level, our hands are tied.  An example, if a member is associated in 
PCIII, MILMOD, with AEF 6 and is pulled for medical reasons,cleared after the 
window for AEF 6 closes, that member is unable to deploy until the following 
years AEF 6 rotation comes up again.  I understand that there need to be rules in 
place, but there also needs to be an avenue to better control our people and their 
usage.  If anything, I believe that the AEF concept has convinced more people to 
retire or seperate than provide stability to members who decide to remain with the 
Air Force.   
 
• survey not well designed--many questions did not pertain to someone who has not 
gone on an AEF rotation or is assigned to an AEF (See question 2).  Over half the 
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questions should have been N/A for me.  Additionally, many units have fight in-
place UTCs as does mine.  Recommend writing questions which address that 
aspect of AEF 
 
• You have no place for AEW members to comment.  We are part of AEF, but not 
part of the AEF rotation.  Missing a big piece of the AEF concept by 
ignoring/forgetting this aspect. 
 
• I left some questions blank.  I was scheduled to deploy with AEF 9/10, but due to 
a pregnancy am unable to deploy.  However, I do not like the AEF concept.  I 
have deployed in the past and was much happier deploying individually.  It gives 
you the chance to gain knowledge & experience from others.  When deployed 
with people from your home base, you don't learn anything new, & you don't have 
as much opportunity to make new friends.  Half the fun of deploying is that you 
get to get away from the people at work that drive you crazy.  With AEF, you get 
stuck working with those people!  With individual deployments, its a volunteer 
basis, and those that deploy are excited & ready to go.  With AEF, everyone has 
to deploy whether they want to or not.  It doesn't make sense.  If you have single 
airmen who want to deploy & married airmen who don't, why force the married 
ones to deploy while the single ones man the home base b/c it's "fair"? 
 
• "This work group concept is fine for the flight crew and those that deploy with 
aircraft.  I am a TMO troop..on a typical AEF we will send anywhere from 0 to 5 
people even though we can be tasked with as many as 15.  We typically don't fly 
out together as a group nor do we all work in one area as a team.  Yes we fly out 
with others from our sq and others from the base but we dont typically know 
those folks and don't usually see them at the deployed location sometimes.  Let's 
say 6 people from my office deploy to the same location, 3 of us work in 
passenger service and 3 of us work in freight, we are not team dyess...we dont 
have a group supervisor or anything like that.  We get there and mesh with the 
other TMO troops and at that point we do our best to be a deployed team.  That 
team may consist of  9 people from 3 bases or 9 people from 7 bases.  The AEF 
Work Group is a great concept for a team deploying with an aircraft but for us 
support units it doesnt quite work the same way nor does it have the same effect.  
It is also difficult on the office when these deployments occur.  We have enough 
people to do the job but when you pull 5 to 10 people that makes the work load 
and the stress level very difficult for those left behind.  You now have half an 
office doing the job of a whole office.  We do benefit from knowing the 
approximate time we could deploy if called.  Another item of concern is the 
tasking requirements.  We get all these taskings with line remarks that make it 
almost impossible to send anybody but our 5 levels and higher.  We have have a 
lot of airman in upgrade, most of the time we can not send them...so we end up 
exhausting our NCO supply with leaves few supervisors behind to do the job. 
 
• Many of these questions are based on false assumptions--I have never deployed. 
Yes, I saw that some sections had the red disclaimer at the top, but #54-65 and 
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102-111 probably need the disclaimer as well. Does the survey mean the same 
thing when is says "work-group" and "deployed work-group" and AEF work-
group?" It's very ambiguous. 
 
• "I strongly believe the concept is super, however some issues that need to be 
tweaked are:  
1) New arrivals (career airmen)PCS to new duty station AEF vulnerbility at 
gaining base. 
2) Swapping personnel from one AEF to another. 
3) Child care assistance to help out spouse." 
 
• "The AFE concept works, when it comes to deploying a team ready to maintain 
their assigned weapons system in mission capable status in an efficeint manner. 
Time is saved by not having to establish work/personal relationships and new 
work peocesses when a big part og the deployed team comes from the same home 
station.  The AFE concept missed the marks when it come to taking care of all AF 
members. The concept of deloyment schedules works better for aircrews and 
maintainers assigned to a flying/operational squadron. If your assigned to an 
operational squadron your AFE schedule has you in the hot seat for one AEF then 
off for 12 months. However, if your a aircraft maintenance person assigned to a 
Maintenance Squadron (MXS) or Equipment Maintenance Squadron (EMS) and 
you support more then one operational squadron you could find yourself having to 
support 2 and sometimes 3 AEF per year. As a flight/shop in a MXS/EMS 
squadron you never get any AFE downtime/recovery period. We always have lost 
manning to an AEF and that has become a problem by increasing our deployment 
requirements and increased work at home station for the folks left behind. Shops 
like an Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE)Flight who loss manpower but very 
little workload because very little equipment is deployed yet a smaller number of 
maintainer are left to maintain the same amount of equipment. A small reduction 
in workload is out weighed by manpower lost.  AFE works for aircrews! Not too 
sure about the other members of the Air Force Team. 
 
• "My AEF window was 1Jun-1 Sep 01, I received a 10 day notice of deployment.  
For me it was no big deal, I understood I could deploy at anytime during my 
window and I was prepared.  My other member of our ""work group"" did not 
deploy with me, I was assigned with two other active duty members from two 
different bases.  Geling together took some time but did it and got along fine.  If I 
could change two things with deploying it would be:  the superintendent of our 
shop should be permenant party for continuity purposes.  We have an extremely 
critical job (NBC plotting, reporting, detection etc.) and having someone there for 
a long period of time would greatly reduce the constant learning AND changing 
procedures.  Secondly, if AF doesn't want to increase permenant party slots then 
to increase deployment time to 179 days.  I feel this would greatly increase the 
continuity for the deployed location and at the same time reduce deployment 
taskings from 4 people per year to 2 people per year being deployed.  The 
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drawback would be home station would suffer more than with just a 90 day 
rotation but I feel it has more benefits than anything. 
 
• We at SJ are not assigned to an aef.  We are an aew.  I would like it much better if 
we were an aef or if the aew would rotate to another wing after a period of time.  
We never know if we will deploy.  We only have a window.  We have not 
deployed in over a year and I believe that this hurts our readiness ability.  As 
personnel rotate to other bases we are left with few who have actually deployed.  
Being part of a regular rotation would be better not only for peice of mind of 
knowing when and where, but it would also help readiness training because you 
can only simulate so much.  To get experience you need to actually deploy. 
 
• The only addresses the AEF...SJ is part of the AEW. Total different concept for 
an AEW.  Also an the AEF concept was developed to meet on-going OPSTEMP 
with set schedules.  With MRC or current situation, the AEF concept does not 
apply due to the increased demand for forces that a single rotation can not fulfill.  
This operations must tap into other AEF rotations to meet the CINCs RFF. 
 
• This survey was a complete waste of time for me...about 90% of this had 
NOTHING to do w/ me.  Asking me questions about my family is ridiculous 
because I'm single, to be more accurate you should ask if someone has a family 
and if the answer is yes, then continue on.  Also not being in an AEF (but in an 
AEW) makes most of these questions not applicable to me at this wing, at least 
the way they are worded now.  I don't mind doing surveys to better processes, but 
when I find I've wasted my time trying to help out it makes me not want to "help" 
in the future.  If you had a Not Applicable choice this survey would be a better 
reflection of the information that you're looking for rather than me having to 
choose an option that is blatantly false.  
 
• "1. AEF concept is workable, but the units send the teams to meld with other units 
from different bases some times it can be a problem - example- 3 Services units 
from different bases send their people, then upon arrival at the deployed location 
we have to find out through personel knowledge, or fact finding sessions on what 
individuals/groups are best suited for the jobs to be done. (Preventive step) When 
we deployed last year our chief coordinated most of this before we left our home 
station. (Food for thought)  2. When you ask the question about ""Home Station 
Work Group"" it should mean Unit Work Group, yes we do deploy with 
personnel from other units from our own base, but most of the time we only work 
with very few of them, -example- CE/SF/SVS. There are exceptions to every 
deployment though once the cliques are broken up- work gets done quicker then. 
 





• Question # 67: Is this question referring to anxious as excited or worried. My 
personal opinion was that it meant excited and therefore I answered as such. 
Please clarify next time. Thank you. 
 
• SUVEYS SHOULDN'T BE SO TIME CONSUMING. A PERSON LOSES 
INTEREST ON WHAT THEY ARE DOING, AND ISN'T 100% HONEST. 
 
• This survey needs an undue button incase you marked a question that isn't 
relavent.  So disregard my answers to questions 73-79. 
 
• I AM ASSIGNED TO AEF 9/10.(LANGLEY LEAD WING) OR SO I'M TOLD.  
OUT OF THE 17 PEOPLE HERE IN MY WORK-GROUP, ONE IS FROM 
LANGLEY(ME).  THERE WERE MANY OTHER AVAILIBLE.  THE AEF 
CONCEPT HAS LITTLE CONTINUNITY IN SOME DUTY SECTIONS.  
WHEN I ARRIVED, EVERYONE LEFT WITHIN A WEEK.  SO IT SEEMS 
AS IF EVERYONE IS STARTING FROM SCRATCH.  IS IT POSSIBLE TO 
OVERLAP SOME POSITIONS(ie 45 days with 8 and 45 days with 10).  I always 
thought that AEF was a wing used to mobilized when needed.  But it seems that 
AEF means go to PSAB. I MUST SAY THAT Pedictability IS A GOOD THING.  
BUT WHEN A TEAMS HAS 5 MEMBERS AND ONLY 1 IS REQUESTED, I 
SENSE A PROBLEM.  IN MY CURRENT SITUATION MANNING IS A 
PROBLEM.  THERE ARE VERY FEW AIRMEN, 3-LEVELS AND 5-LEVELS.  
IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE AN NCO WHEN 12 PEOPLE OUTRANK YOU.  
MOST OF US (SSGT/TSGT) ARE NOT NEED HERE AT THE SAME TIME.   
 
• "Very confusing survey - when I made a mistake in answering questions 69-79 
which did not apply to me I could not go back and clear my choices.  Other 
questions require a receint deployment as well but did not have a ""skip if you 
haven't deployed in the last___"" disclaimer.  These questions also did not allow 
an ""N/A"" answer if the individual had not receintly deployed.   
 
• I assume from this surrvey that whomever put it together has no clue what is 
happening to the people in the field in reference to AEF--bottom line we do not 
have enough people to get the job done in the AF. 
 
• This is a really god survey.  It should how ever be sent to people that are on the 
AEF's to make it of any use to you.  I and my co workers are not on a team. 
 
• My husband and I are both ADAF and we both serve our country.  Each of our 
jobs require different sacrifices and objectives.  I do not feel the AirForce (our 
squadrons) is fair to people who are married to another ADAF mamber.  We 
PCSd here in July and still have not settled in.  This base does not seen to be 
welcoming. My husband deploys more than I do and what is frustrating (even 
before the current military situation we are in) is being told everyother month that 
there is a possibility of him deploying.  This has affected our life several times.  It 




• The AEF center needs to get control of the AEF process.  There is a complete 
disconnect between the AEF center, the leadership at the deployed location, and 
home station leadership.  Exactly who has authoirty to reduce/decide not to man 
certain positions?  Who has authority to increase manning requirements, who 
develops and enforces deployment packages for unit sizes that are not already 
built, such as 12 F-15's vs 18 F-15's?  Last is parts.  ACC Supply support of parts 
is pathetic.  Unit requests for parts stock prior to deployment are disregarded.  
Who better than the unit to actually determine what they need in a specific 
environent, especially since these units have been there many times before.  The 
models used by Supply are wholly inaccurate and unrealistic, such as the expected 
sortie duration.  The poor parts availability and long supply chains, lead to extra 
work for those deployed in hostile environments, and significantly decreases 
morale. 
 
• "The AEF system does not really change the way my AFSC deploys.  We are 
always a group of individuals deployed from different bases so much of this 
survey did not apply. 
 
• Many of your questions were repeditive.  They were simply rephrased and asked 
again often opposite in meaning.   
 
• The phrasing of some of the questions was confusing, for example 111.  Sould I 
answer Yes, our work-group has not deployed yet.  Or No, our work-group has 
not deployed yet.  Both mean that our work-group has not deployed yet.  " 
 
• This is the second time that being away from my Spouse has negatively affected 
my marriage.  That part of deploying is not fun anymore.  The work relationships 
that developed were great for me personally.  The TDY was not a problem to go 
on but there were several problems that happened at home station that might have 
prevented anxiety.  Medical problems for spouses and the inability to "be able to 
be there for them" during a trying time.  There were 5 seperate individuals that 
had stuff like that happen during this deployment.  That affected the moral a bit as 
the people (me included) were worried about the home life. 
 
• "1. You spoke incessantly about the AEF team concept and deployed work groups 
in the survey.  It is true that we deploy as UTCs, and it has been effective; 
however, I hope you do not draw parallels to wing deployments.  There is a move 
afoot among senior AF leadership to have wings deploy as teams--they feel it's 
the right thing to do.  I applaud and share in that spirit, but they forgot recent 
history: when we stood up the EAF in 1998, we broke the bank of ""ECS""--
support forces, that is.  We still would today.  Supporters do a great job in the 
AOR--we don't have to be tied to our weapons systems--and I hope our wing CCs 
don't ask us to further sacrifice in support their myopic regard for their own class 
of jets.  We suffer enough deploying in every ""bucket"", versus one or two for 
the ops side of the house, and coming home to endless local inspections/exercises.  
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Mine doesn't sound like a team attitude, but we supporters are ""team"" to a fault: 
our pain threshold is sky-high, we go to extraordinary lengths to do everything, 
and we do fairly well at it.  Given the circumstances, deploying by UTC or 
""work group"" is still the answer.  2. We've been enforcing a no-fly zone over 
Iraq for a decade.  When you sit back and look at the questions we're asking 
ourselves about the apparatus we've engineered to conduct ONW/OSW, you have 
to marvel at the sheer magnitude of it.  As officers we must remain a-political, but 
I think it will be sad if, after my 20-26 year career (began in '90) our national 
security strategy still has Hussein in power, along with the resultant US 
operations.  This and the excess military infrastructure the congress forces us to 
maintain have been the two greatest detractors from my career field in the past ten 
years.  We've done amazingly well despite the odds, due to the efforts of a lot of 
smart people, but training and retention have suffered greatly, and still do.  The 
troops consistently tell me they don't need more benfits, they need more co-
workers on base and working.  We work seven days for every five most people 
work, and at least an hour longer each day.  In stead of improving ""steady 
state"", we should be trying to make it not ""steady"", or not even a ""state"" at 
all." 
 
• I know nothing about AEF 
 
• Seperate the surveys.  One for people who deploy and one for people that don't 
deploy. 
 
• I din't finish the survey as it asks alot about our work-group, deployment team, 
the deployment, etc.  The people in my squadron backfill slots on every other 
AEF cycle which the reserves don't fill.  I have not yet been deployed on an AEF 
deployment, but recently went to an exercise in Egypt--not sure if that counts. 
 
• I feel this survey should be sent to members who have deployed or belong to a 
AEF.  I think a separate survey could be done for those who have never deployed  
but have the possiblity.  It is hard to take a survey on something you have never 
experienced.  
 
• You never mentioned the two AEWs so, I partly assumed they were considered as 
AEFs.    
 
• The AEF concept is great on paper.  Unfortunately, personnel are being pulled to 
supplement packages when it is not their turn which leads to chaos due to out-of-
turn rotations and backfilling.  This is creating grave problems within 
maintenance career fields.  We are trying to distribute our experienced personnel 
equitiably throughout the cycle.  When we have to backfill, it kills our experience 
levels on later deployments.  Also, leadership has not addressed the problem with 
back-shop career fields such as mine which are required to support tenant units.  
Will are supporting ACC as well as AMC rotations.  This essentially doubles our 
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ops tempo.  (No wonder we can't keep our sharpest married first and second 
termers) 
 
• "-What is the purpose of this survey? You have asked the same question posed 
119 different ways.  This survey and its answers are subjective not objective, you 
are asking what I think not in reality is true.  This survey is extremely too long, 
cut to the point.  I reread the email that came with this and still do not get what the 
point of this survey was to accomplish, you all asked the same question 119 
different ways and the overall effectivness was decreased. After the first 50 
question I could not sit still long enough to read the next 69 questions.  
 
• I tried to answer this survey as an individual and a home station work group.  I 
deployed with a fighter squadron from my home station as an individual, but went 
as a group to support them.  Some of the members I was aquainted with and 
others first time knowledge. 
 
• I Felt my deployment was a palace tenure. I deployed as an individual 2 weeks 
earlier than the rest of my group. Also from my experience the AEF concept only 
works for flying squadrons. Those of us who are not assigned to a flying squadron 
have to be a lot more flexible because we dont know if we will be pulled as an 
individual or a team 
 
• In your multiple choice questions (ie. Strongly disagree - Strongly agree) you 
should add N/A for those who have not deployed yet as a group on the new AEF 
system. 
 
• Although I'm not currently assigned to an AEF, I'm responsible for assigning 
other members of the flight to AEF positions.  From all the briefings we received 
on AEF and EAFs, I fully understand how they are suppose to work.  
Unfortunately they're not working.  AEFs were suppose to allow us to fight 2 
majors war simulateously, yet we've had to accelarte the AEF cycles to keep up 
with the demands of the current war.  This hasn't allowed people to take care of 
personal issues as they planned.  We've had confusing information flowing down 
from the AEF center and at times we been tasked for deployments by people 
going around the AEF center.  The concept looks good on paper, but it hasn't 
worked was a major conflict was taken on.  My people are confused and anxious 
because they feel we are back at square one.  No one has confidence in the system 
because they no longer know when they will be tasked to deploy.  The team 
deployment is a good idea, but if you can't stay with a deployment schedule, get 
rid of it.  We seem to be only slightly more prepared to deploy than we were 
before AEF was implemented. 
 
• As lead wing in AEF 8, we were in the bucket on 11 Sep 01.  From the wing 
perspective, it would have made more sense to deploy the 28AEW as a cohesive 
unit vice sending some aviators one place and the support group another.  Also, 
tasking the on call wing's bomber aviation package first makes sense until the size 
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of the deployed avaiation package exceedes their capability at which time the lead 
wing's aviation package is tasked to round out the unit.  Had the lead wing's on 
call aviation packages been tasked instead, it would have made the deployment 
much easier since only one unit could have filled the tasking vice having to 
rainbow two units in a manner the deployment machine isn't set up to handle.  
This caused us to send people without hardcopy orders because there wasn't 
enough time for the system to process backfills for shortfalls that were, in reality, 
not shortfalls at all but a rainbow package. While we have to be flexible, which 
we were because we made it happen, there needs to be a better correlation 
between what we tell our folks the AEF structure means to them/how we train for 
deployments and what we are really going to be asked to do.  Bottom line is that 
we were tasked to deploy, in our AEF window, in a manner that we cannot 
exercise because the system isn't designed to handle it.  At the unit level, we did 
what we had to do to make it happen but we encountered much confusion and 
conflicting guidance from above in the process. 
 
• As a member of a high-demand asset, we are deployed all the time.  The AEF 
concept means nothing to us!  We are deployed or TDY most of the year 
regardless of the AEF concept.  What reconstitution period?  I'd love to see one!  
We pilots talk among ourselves and feel the military continues to dig the hole 
deeper.  Why would any of our young troops possibly want to stay in with no 
stability, no home life, and no hope of it improving? 
 
• I HAVE CURENTLY NOT BEEN DEPLOYED AS AN AEF. I ONLY HAVE 
DEPLOYED AS AN INDIVIDUEL SO I CURRENTLY DO NOT HAVE 
MUCH SAY IN THE AEF ACTUALLY WORKING OR NOT WORKING AS 
A GROUP. PERSONALLY I HAD A BETTER EXPERIENCE MEETING NEW 
PEOPLE AND UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENT WAYS OR THE AIR 
FORCE BEING DEPLOYED AS AN IDIVIDUAL. IT ADDED A BETTER 
JUDGEMENT ON MY RE-ENLISTMENT DECISION. WHEN DEPLOYED 
AS AN AEF YOUR VEIW OF THE AIR FORCE IS STILL YOUR BASE, 
YOUR COMMAND GROUP, AND THE SAME PERSONEL YOU WORK 
WITH. 
 
• For the most part, ...I like AEF.  I enjoyed deploying with a cadre of folks I know 
and work with.  Yet, it was nice to have others mixed in from other units, and the 
ANG.  I felt our AEF 5 in 2000 to PSAB went superb!  It was one of the best 
experiences I've had in the Air Force in 22 years. 
 
• The AEF concept seems to be a great idea.  I'm just waiting to see it implimented.  
I've deployed twice as individual and haven't seen a group of us deployed together 
yet!  I applaud the idea and hope the actions follow soon.  
 
• I like the AEF concept, but it doesn't work for Combat Support operations.  
Example:  Teams don't always stay together, teams don't go with assigned 




• My experience with the AEF is that I have not deployed with a group.  I have 
generally been tasked separately to join a group in the field.  At the wing level, 
team members might deploy with the wing, but because of remaining 
responsibility at the home station, a full team does not get deployed (Half go, half 
stay behind) so it has to be augmented from other locations.  Since the AEF 
concept I have been deployed twice and never with a group from my home 
station.  So far the AEF concept has not had much of an impact on me personally, 
and from what I hear from others, it has not impacted the weather career field 
much either. 
 
• "I deployed with people from my unit.  We did not hate each other, but we did not 
like each other.  Reputations wheather just or unjust follow you with teams.  I as 
the team member was charged with sexual harrassment based on a precevied life 
style at my home station.  I do not associate with military people when off duty 
and therefore do not deserve my ""ladies man"" reputation.  This made my job as 
Team Leader harder.  If I had been with other people, this would have never 
happened.  I can provide proof of this as needed.   
 
• As the Wing Vice Commander, I am not scheduled for any AEF rotation.  
However, I am worldwide deployable.  My last AEF-like event was the summer 
of 1999 when I was the commander of the 3d AEG to Kwang Ju, ROK...a very 
positive experience.  Overall the AEF concept has been very good for 1 FW 
personnel.  ONE and OEF are the add-ons due to current events.  Everyone seems 
to understand that these are special times, outside of the normal AEF construct.  I 
would definitely like to see the AEF Center assume more power with some 
control and direction over the AOR.  Keep up the good work. 
 
• "SOME OF THE QUESTIONS WERE WORDED LIKE DOUBLE 
NEGATIVES AND I WAS CONFUSED AT HOW TO ANSWER.  DOES 
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